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Implementing Proportionality 
Perry L. Moriearty* 
Over the last fourteen years, the Supreme Court has issued five 
decisions that impose substantive constraints on our harshest punishments 
— forbidding the execution of those with “mental retardation” in Atkins 
v. Virginia, of juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, and of those convicted of 
child sexual assault in Kennedy v. Louisiana, and forbidding the sentence 
of life without parole for juveniles who had not killed in Graham v. 
Florida and for all juveniles when it is imposed mandatorily in Miller v. 
Alabama. Because the offenders in question were categorically less 
culpable, the proscribed punishment was disproportionately severe, the 
Court held. In many respects, these decisions reinvigorated the Court’s 
substantive proportionality jurisprudence, which had been virtually 
dormant for two decades. Yet, three of the five decisions simply have not 
yielded in practice what they promised in principle. The implementation of 
Atkins, Graham and Miller has been so protracted, litigious and 
encumbered by procedural obstacles that, of the nearly 3,000 inmates 
nominally impacted by the decisions, only a fraction has been relieved of 
their sentences. In the meantime, inmates with IQs of 61 have been 
executed, and others have died waiting to hear whether the Court’s 
decisions apply retroactively. 
This Article argues that, despite its transformative potential, the Court’s 
contemporary proportionality jurisprudence has been diminished in scope 
and potency in the course of its implementation — a dynamic that has 
been called “slippage.” In many respects, the “slippage” of these mandates 
can be attributed to the decisions themselves, which are deregulatory and, 
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in concert with the Court’s broader efforts to limit federal court 
jurisdiction over state criminal justice processes, tie the scope of relief to 
the political whims and majoritarian preferences of the States. On some 
issues, the procedural docility of these decisions has proven so problematic 
that the Court has twice within the last two years had to intervene, 
striking portions of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in 2014 and, just 
weeks ago, declaring in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller does in fact 
apply retroactively. While the Court’s reluctance to regulate the 
implementation of its proportionality mandates may be rationalized as 
necessary deference to the principles of federalism and finality, these 
justifications are far less compelling in the Eighth Amendment context. 
The very establishment of federal habeas, executive clemency, and 
Supreme Court review suggests that the Framers themselves recognized 
that there are normative points when interests in federalism and finality 
simply must yield. By contrast, the risk of offending constitutional norms 
through slippage may be at their most pronounced since one of the Eighth 
Amendment’s primary purposes is to protect the politically powerless from 
government overreach. I conclude that, if the Court is serious about 
implementing in practice the substantive constraints on punishment it has 
imposed over the last fourteen years, it must accompany its substantive 
mandates with a minimum threshold of procedural prescription. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade and a half, the Supreme Court has issued five 
decisions imposing substantive constraints on the harshest forms of 
punishment in this country — forbidding the execution of individuals 
with “mental retardation” in Atkins v. Virginia,1 those under eighteen 
in Roper v. Simmons,2 and those convicted of rape of a child in Kennedy 
v. Louisiana.3 The Court has also banned life sentences without the 
possibility of parole for juveniles who had not committed homicide in 
Graham v. Florida,4 and for all juveniles when imposed mandatorily in 
Miller v. Alabama.5 In each case, a sharply divided Court held that the 
offender in question, whether by virtue of age, mental status, or the 
nature of the crime committed, did not deserve the proscribed 
punishment. The punishment was, in other words, disproportionate 
under the Eighth Amendment. 
To many scholars, these decisions reinvigorated the Court’s 
substantive proportionality jurisprudence, which had been virtually 
dormant for two decades.6 Collectively, they amounted to a doctrinal 
 
 1 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 2 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 3 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 4 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 5 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 6 See, e.g., Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida 
and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
86, 86 (2010) (“Graham contains the ingredients to be of transformative significance 
to the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”); Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure in the 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 722-31, 735 
(2008) [hereinafter Lessons from Substance] (noting that, because Atkins was the first 
Supreme Court case to find an American criminal practice excessive in the absence of 
an overwhelming legislative consensus, it had “opened the path not only to other 
proportionality limitations on the reach of the death penalty, but also to the prospect 
of judicial abolition of the death penalty itself”); Jordan Steiker, United States: Roper v. 
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and methodological pivot by a Court that had for years taken a 
decidedly hands-off approach to sentencing review, as laws of 
unprecedented severity proliferated.7 Though the Court heavily 
regulated capital sentencing procedures through the 1980s and 
1990s,8 it avoided the imposition of substantive constraints.9 With 
Atkins, the Court shifted its stance, expanding the scope of its Eighth 
Amendment protections and augmenting its methodological approach 
to proportionality review. In Roper, the Court looked to international 
norms and practices as a barometer of consensus10 — something it had 
 
Simmons, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 163, 165 (2006) [hereinafter U.S.: Roper v. Simmons] 
(noting that Roper appears to be part of a larger effort to regulate the American death 
penalty system and “provides a blueprint not simply for increased judicial regulation 
of the capital practices but also for judicial abolition of the American death penalty 
altogether”).  
 7 See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and 
What It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 1041, 1052 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of the Eighth Amendment signaled that it was finally willing to halt “ceding 
all punishment decisions to the legislature without a modicum of judicial and 
constitutional checks and balances”). The list of cases in which the Court upheld 
especially punitive state sanctions is expansive. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957 (1991) (affirming sentence of life-without-parole for first offense of 
possessing 672 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) 
(affirming two consecutive sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to 
distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263 (1980) (affirming life-with-parole sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by false 
pretenses where defendant had two prior convictions). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 296-302 (1983) (reversing sentence of life-without-parole for presenting a 
worthless check for $100, where defendant had six prior felonies). 
 8 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a 
mandatory death penalty statute on grounds that it foreclosed individualized 
consideration of the offender and offense); see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 
U.S. 154, 171 (1994) (invalidating limits on defense-sponsored testimony regarding 
the unavailability of parole in cases where the prosecution emphasized the prospective 
dangerousness of the defendant); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985) 
(limiting prosecutorial efforts to diminish jurors’ sense of responsibility for their 
verdict based on an inaccurate characterization of the scope of appellate review). 
 9 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (rejecting Eighth 
Amendment challenge to execution of juveniles who were sixteen and seventeen years 
old at the time of the offense); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (rejecting 
Eighth Amendment challenge to execution of persons with mental retardation); see 
also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 438 
(1995) [hereinafter Sober Second Thoughts] (arguing that the Court’s excessively 
procedural focus on death penalty law during the two decades post-Furman v. Georgia 
had wrought the “worst of all possible worlds”). 
 10 The Court cites to Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, for example, which expressly prohibits juvenile executions and which every 
country in the world has ratified with the exceptions of the United States and Somalia. 
  
2017] Implementing Proportionality 965 
done only in passing in prior decisions11 — and in Graham, it applied 
to a non-capital sentence for the first time the robust proportionality 
analysis previously reserved for capital cases.12 The Court’s reasoning 
in these cases might one day extend to the mentally ill,13 scholars 
claimed, and called into question other juvenile processing14 and 
sentencing decisions.15 The general consensus was that this 
jurisprudence had the potential to transform the regulation of 
sentencing in the United States.16 
 
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576, 604 (2005) (citing to Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002)) (“Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court 
has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment 
of evolving standards of decency.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality 
opinion) (referencing the abolition of juvenile death penalty “by other nations that 
share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western 
European community”). 
 12 In doing so, the Court all but eviscerated its “death is different” approach to 
proportionality review, Justice Thomas lamented in dissent. See Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 103 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (declaring “‘[d]eath is different’ no 
longer”); see also Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”: 
Graham v. Florida and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital 
Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 379 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s decision 
“marked a significant break with past practice”). 
 13 See, e.g., Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near?: The Impact of 
Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill Defendants, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 477-78, 480-83 (2007) (discussing how excessive punishments 
are judged by currently prevailing standards and how defendants with diminished 
capacity are not likely to be deterred); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving 
Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
785, 819-20 (2009) (analyzing how the death penalty is a disproportionate 
punishment for defendants with mental illness because it does not meet the 
penological goals of retribution and deterrence). 
 14 See generally Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile 
Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010) (suggesting that lawyers use Graham to 
challenge the constitutionality of adult court transfer statutes). 
 15 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Breen & John R. Mills, Mandating Discretion: Juvenile 
Sentencing Schemes After Miller v. Alabama, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 307-09 (2015). 
 16 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49 
(2010) (“It would be hard to overstate the significance of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Graham v. Florida.”); Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. 1787, 1788-89 (2016) (arguing that Miller was revolutionary in logic and scope); 
Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy of Atkins and Roper: The Unreliability Principle, 
Mentally Ill Defendants, and the Death Penalty’s Unraveling, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
487, 487 (2014) (arguing that “the cases have a far more revolutionary reach than 
their conventional understanding”).  
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What has received far less attention, however, is whether these 
decisions have achieved in practice what they promised in principle17: 
whether the Court’s promise to exempt from execution the 
intellectually disabled, juveniles and those convicted of the sexual 
assault, and to exempt from life without parole juveniles who not 
committed homicide and all juveniles when it is mandatory, have in 
fact been implemented by the thirty affected states.18 The answer is 
decidedly mixed. 
This Article makes three primary claims. First, the Court’s modern 
proportionality jurisprudence has substantially eroded in the course of 
its implementation — a dynamic that scholars have called 
constitutional “slippage” in other contexts.19 While Kennedy and Roper 
were implemented without significant opposition,20 the 
implementation of Atkins, Miller, and to a lesser extent Graham, has 
been protracted, litigious, geographically disunited, and, in some 
cases, evaded altogether. As a result, these decisions have, in a number 
of jurisdictions, lived up to neither their doctrinal guarantees nor their 
underlying principles. Four structural and cultural features of the U.S. 
criminal justice system have contributed: a long-standing cultural 
resistance in most jurisdictions to incorporating scientific expertise 
 
 17 Many scholars have looked at the impact of some of these decisions in isolation. 
See Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 91-104 (2015) 
(examining the implementation of Miller); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 51, 64-82 (2012) (analyzing the implementation of Graham); Steiker & 
Steiker, Lessons from Substance, supra note 6, at 722-31 (examining the implementation 
of Atkins). But none have considered the implementation of the Court’s modern 
proportionality jurisprudence in the aggregate. This Article fills this gap. 
 18 As discussed in Part II, infra, both legal scholars and political scientists have 
defined compliance with judicial mandates as the process through which political 
authorities carry out the action (or avoid action) called for (or prohibited) in court 
rulings. See, e.g., Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Compliance: 
Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Explaining Adherence to Judicial Rulings, 38 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 803, 806 (2013) (citing ALEXEI TROCHEV, JUDGING RUSSIA: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT IN RUSSIAN POLITICS 1990–2006 (2008); James F. Spriggs, II, Explaining Federal 
Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567, 567-93 
(1997)). 
 19 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (defining “slippage” as the 
gap “between a constitutional norm and its enforcement”); see also Daniel Farber, 
Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental 
Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 297 (1999) (calling “slippage” the breaks between 
what law mandates and what actually happens). As set forth below, however, the 
slippage of the Court’s modern proportionality jurisprudence was predictable because 
the holdings were substantively and procedurally lean. 
 20 See infra Part II.A.  
  
2017] Implementing Proportionality 967 
into policy-making; elected officials’ continued attraction to “tough on 
crime” policies; the procedural complexity and rigidity of state post-
conviction processes; and, in many states, the absence of robust 
systems of parole and release. The net effect has been the states’ 
“procedural evasion of [the Court’s] new substantive rights.”21 
As a result, sentencing relief has been elusive. Perhaps the plainest 
evidence is that until recently, of the nearly 3,000 inmates22 ostensibly 
entitled to some form of collateral relief in the aftermath of Atkins, 
Graham and Miller, only a third had even been deemed eligible, and 
far fewer have actually obtained meaningful relief.23 In some instances, 
the consequences have been deeply disturbing: in 2012, a fifty-four 
year old Texas inmate with an IQ of 61, who reportedly sucked his 
thumb and could not always tell the difference between left and right, 
was executed — a casualty of Texas’ highly restrictive and unscientific 
Atkins framework.24 
In fact, the states’ responses to Atkins and Miller have been so 
uneven and, in some cases, obstructionist, that a reluctant Court has 
stepped in three times within the last two years. In 2014 in Hall v. 
Florida, the Court struck a portion of Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme, declaring that it imposed such extreme burdens on Atkins 
petitioners that it created “an unacceptable risk that persons with 
intellectual disability will be executed.”25 In January 2016, the Court 
announced in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller does in fact apply to 
 
 21 Steiker & Steiker, Lessons from Substance, supra note 6 at 731. This is not to say 
that these decisions have been entirely unproductive. In the juvenile sentencing arena, 
Miller has prompted the abolition of juvenile life without parole in nine states. See 
infra Part I.B. Among some of the states that retain juvenile life without parole 
policies, legislatures and courts have diminished their impact through reforms that 
narrow the application of life without parole. 
 22 The Miller Court estimated that approximately 2,000 inmates in the United 
States were serving mandatory life without parole sentences for offenses they 
committed as juveniles, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting), the Graham Court identified 123 inmates who were sentenced as juveniles 
to life without parole for offenses other than homicide, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 64, 110, 113 (2010), and a recent study showed that, in the decade after Atkins 
was decided, 371 of the 4819 (7.7%) death row inmates or capital defendants who 
could have raised Atkins claims did so, and, of these, roughly half prevailed. See John 
H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and 
Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of a Categorical 
Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 396 (2014) [hereinafter A Tale of Two]. 
 23 See infra Part II.A. 
 24 Andrew Cohen, Of Mice and Men: The Execution of Marvin Wilson, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
8, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/of-mice-and-men-the-
execution-of-marvin-wilson/260713/.  
 25 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 
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the approximately 2,100 inmates who had been sentenced to 
mandatory life without parole as juveniles, but whose cases were final 
when the decision was issued.26 And in November, the Court clarified 
that “[e]ven if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or 
her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth 
Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity.”27 
Second, the slippage of the Court’s substantive proportionality 
mandates is, in many respects, a natural and even foreseeable 
consequence of the decisions themselves, which are narrowly drawn 
and virtually devoid of procedural prescription. Though both Graham 
and Miller are grounded firmly within the Court’s proportionality 
jurisprudence, the decisions whittled away at the sentence of juvenile 
life without parole, without banning it outright.28 In doing so, the 
Court left the States to wrestle with substantive questions about 
concepts as nebulous as diminished culpability, mitigation, and 
amenability to rehabilitation, and as technical as retroactivity. 
In Atkins, the Court expressly left to the states “the task of 
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction” 
on executing the mentally retarded.29 Similarly, in Miller, it declared 
that juvenile offenders must be afforded individualized sentencing and 
a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,”30 without defining either 
concept, nor indicating how and to whom they should apply. In fact, 
the Graham majority’s regulatory reticence was so blatant that Justice 
 
 26 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 736 (2016) (holding Miller to be 
a substantive rule retroactive to cases on collateral review).  
 27 Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 11-12 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding five cases in which defendants 
convicted of committing murders while under the age of 18 were sentenced to life 
without parole because “none of the sentencing judges addressed the question Miller 
and Montgomery require a sentencer to ask: whether the petitioner was among the 
very ‘rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent 
incorrigibility’”). 
 28 See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring 
Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 398-99, 412 (2013) (“If life imprisonment for 
juveniles were itself substantively cruel . . . the Court should have banned it outright 
instead of simply leaving open a chance at parole or allowing sentencers to impose 
LWOP on certain killers.”). 
 29 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 405, 416-17 (1986)). 
 30 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 51 (2010)). 
  
2017] Implementing Proportionality 969 
Thomas predicted in dissent that the Court’s opinion would “embroil 
the courts for years.”31 
Adding to the fallout from the Court’s narrow and deregulatory 
approach in these decisions have been its parallel efforts to safeguard 
the States’ autonomy over their criminal and collateral proceedings 
through a series of decisions that limit habeas corpus and restrict 
retroactivity. Just a year after the Court decided Atkins, it held in 
Ewing v. California32 that a prison term of twenty-five years to life 
under California’s three-strikes law for shoplifting by a repeat offender 
was not cruel and unusual. “[O]ur tradition of deferring to state 
legislatures in making and implementing such important policy 
decisions is longstanding,” Justice O’Connor emphasized.33 Since 
Ewing, the Court has issued numerous decisions restricting the 
retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure34 and 
rendering federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions 
almost non-existent.35 Operating virtually unchecked by the federal 
courts, and given license to restrict the remedial scope of the Court’s 
new proportionality rules, it is not surprising that states have taken 
wildly different approaches to implementation, leaving the substantive 
mandates announced in Atkins, Graham and Miller to “turn upon . . . 
trivialities,”36 “vary from place to place and from time to time,”37 and 
to create a procedural landscape that resembles a “crazy quilt.”38 
 
 31 Graham, 560 U.S. at 123 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 32 538 U.S. 11, 28-31 (2003). 
 33 Id. at 24; see, e.g., id. at 28 (“We do not sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to second-guess 
[California’s] policy choices. It is enough that the State of California has a reasonable 
basis for believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual felons 
‘advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial way.’”). 
 34 See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (holding that Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires a jury (not a judge) to find aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the 
death penalty, does not apply retroactively to cases on federal habeas review); see also 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 727-32 (2016) (discussing the numerous 
procedural thresholds that a federal habeas petition must navigate in order to obtain 
relief).  
 35 See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (explaining that 
AEDPA “[s]ection 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against 
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” not a substitute for 
ordinary error correction through appeal”) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 
332 n.5 (1979)). 
 36 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996). 
 37 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 815).  
 38 See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (“Turning a blind eye to federal 
constitutional error that benefits criminal defendants, allowing it to permeate in 
varying fashion each State Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, would change the uniform 
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Finally, while the Court’s deregulatory and narrow approach to 
substantive decision-making can be rationalized as promoting the 
principles of federalism and finality,39 the constitutional slippage it 
sows is far less tolerable in the Eighth Amendment context. Society’s 
interests in finality and federalism are simply weaker when it comes to 
the implementation of proportionality guarantees.40 There is also a 
normative point at which society’s interest in federalism must yield. 
Both the Court41 and the Framers recognized as much. As Doug 
Berman has written, while the Framers sought to preserve state 
sovereignty over matters of criminal process,42 they were also 
unequivocal in their intent to give criminal defendants in the colonial 
era various means of challenging government action. They did so by 
preventing the legislative branch from suspending habeas review, 
empowering the executive to grant clemency, and authorizing the 
Supreme Court to hear appeals.43 
By contrast, the risk of offending constitutional norms through 
slippage and disunity may be most pronounced with Eighth 
Amendment proportionality rules. It is generally accepted that one of 
the Eighth Amendment’s primary roles is to protect the politically 
powerless from government overreach.44 Yet, when the Court links the 
 
‘law of the land’ into a crazy quilt.”). 
 39 The Court itself said as much in cases like Williams v. Taylor, where it 
characterized limits on federal habeas corpus relief as necessary to vindicate society’s 
interests in “comity, finality, and federalism.” 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).  
 40 See Perry Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality 
Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 981 (2015) (arguing that finality interests are less 
compelling with sentences than they are with convictions). 
 41 See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921) (“The Constitution was 
intended — its very purpose was — to prevent experimentation with the fundamental 
rights of the individual.”).  
 42 See Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 154 (2014) (observing that “criminal adjudications 
in the Founding Era lacked many of the legal formalities and procedural particulars 
now familiar to modern lawyers: criminal trials, which were frequent and speedy, 
involved a ‘common-sense, public moral judgment’ in which laymen were central 
players” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) 
(“[I]n areas such as criminal law enforcement or education . . . States historically have 
been sovereign.”). 
 43 Berman, supra note 42, at 155 (noting that “Article I, Section 9 instructs 
Congress that the ‘Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,’ 
Article II, Section 2 provides that the President ‘shall have Power to grant Reprieves 
and Pardons for Offences against the United States,’ and Article III, Section 2 provides 
that the Supreme Court ‘shall have appellate Jurisdiction’”). 
 44 See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 907 (2011) (noting that the historical focus 
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scope and potency of its Eighth Amendment protections to the 
political whims and majoritarian preferences of individual 
jurisdictions, as it has done in these cases, these constitutional 
protections are often fundamentally compromised. Indeed, the same 
social forces that hinder meaningful participation in the political 
process and perpetuate prejudice have the potential to affect 
decisionmaking by state political bodies and individual actors. 
There is also the more basic concern that issuing substantive 
mandates with no assurance of their enforcement undermines the 
Court’s own legitimacy. It is, in the words of Carol Steiker, akin to 
speaking in “two voices to two different audiences . . . [t]hose ‘in the 
know’ realize that the substantive right runs only as far as its effective 
enforcement . . . [while] [t]he less sophisticated general public, 
however, is likely to accept at face value that the United States no 
longer [imposes the punishments in question.]”45 In our current 
climate, in which the vast majority of those who stand to benefit from 
these substantive rights are people of color,46 such duplicity is 
especially problematic. 
While my purpose is less to offer a list of prescriptions than it is to 
document and provide a normative assessment of the slippage of the 
Court’s contemporary proportionality jurisprudence, if the Court is 
serious about implementing in practice the substantive constraints on 
punishment that it has imposed through its modern proportionality 
jurisprudence, it must be willing to incorporate a minimum threshold 
of procedural prescription. Recently, a handful of commentators have 
explored the use of what they call the Court’s prophylactic “anti-
 
was not on punishments that were ‘“cruel and rare” but on those that are “cruel and 
new,” which suggests “the core purpose of the Clause is to protect criminal offenders 
when the government’s desire to inflict pain has become temporarily and unjustly 
enflamed, whether this desire is caused by political or racial animus or moral panic in 
the face of a perceived crisis”). 
 45 Steiker & Steiker, Lessons from Substance, supra note 6, at 734.  
 46 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 14 (2016) (reporting that “racial disparities vary 
broadly across the states, as high as 12.2:1, but even in Hawaii — the state with the 
lowest black/white disparity — African Americans are imprisoned more than two 
times the rate of whites.”); LEAH SAKALA, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, BREAKING DOWN 
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 2010 CENSUS: STATE-BY-STATE INCARCERATION RATES BY 
RACE/ETHNICITY (2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html (calculating 
the racial makeup on the U.S. prison population as 40 percent black, despite the fact 
that blacks make up thirteen percent of the total U.S. population); Criminal Justice 
Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, http://www. 
naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet (last visited Aug. 10, 2016) (“African 
Americans are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of whites.”). 
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evasion doctrines,” procedural devices that seek “to optimize 
constitutional enforcement by curbing circumvention of constitutional 
principles.”47 The Court’s clarification in Hall v. Florida that Atkins 
requires the incorporation of professional views about threshold IQ 
scores and adaptive functioning, and Montgomery’s presumption 
against juvenile life without parole sentences48 suggests that the Court 
is willing to employ such devices. They also indicate that the Court is 
willing to entertain new constitutional challenges to overly rigid 
practices and methodologies when it comes to the implementation of 
the harshest punishments. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I gives a brief overview of 
the Supreme Court’s efforts over the last decade and a half to impose 
substantive constraints on the death penalty and the sentence of life 
without parole in cases where the offender in question, whether by 
virtue of age, mental status, or the nature of the crime committed, is 
not sufficiently culpable.49 Part II then turns to the implementation of 
these decisions by the States, arguing that three of the five decisions 
issued by the Court simply have not produced in practice what they 
promised in principle.50 This constitutional “slippage” can be 
attributed both to the structural features of state criminal justice 
processes and also to substantive and procedural deficiencies in the 
decisions themselves. Finally, Part III makes the case that the erosion 
of substantive doctrine is far less tolerable in the Eighth Amendment 
context and advocates that, when proportionality rules are at stake, a 
minimum threshold of procedural prophylaxes is warranted.51 
I. REGULATING PROPORTIONALITY 
With its decisions over the last fourteen years in Atkins v. Virginia, 
Roper v. Simmons, Kennedy v. Louisiana, Graham v. Florida and Miller 
v. Alabama, the Supreme Court imposed substantive constraints on the 
 
 47 Brandon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in 
Constitutional Law, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2013); see also Matthew C. 
Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial 
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2008) (arguing that 
courts should protect constitutional guarantees by using doctrines designed to raise 
the cost to government decisionmakers who enact unconstitutional policies).  
 48 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (“Miller did bar life 
without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose 
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”).  
 49 See infra Part I. 
 50 See infra Part II. 
 51 See infra Part III. 
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harshest forms of punishment administered in this country. In doing 
so, the Court reinvigorated its substantive proportionality 
jurisprudence in many critical respects. 
A. Twentieth Century Formalism 
It is generally accepted that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment contains a proportionality requirement.52 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly held that the ban “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice 
that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned 
to [the] offense,’”53 interpreting the requirement to include “not only 
those punishments that are ‘barbaric’ but also those that are ‘excessive’ 
in relation to the crime and the committed.”54 Despite this basic 
premise, however, the Court’s approach to regulation over the last 
century was disjointed, shifting from substantive intervention to 
procedural surplus and back again. And until recently, the Court also 
maintained a rigid barrier between capital and non-capital sentencing 
review, reserving its truly rigorous analysis for capital sentences alone. 
 
 52 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1049, 1064 (2004) (tracing the concept of proportionality to the Magna Carta and 
arguing that it is inaccurate to base the rejection of proportionality review on history); 
Stinneford, supra note 44, at 926-27 (arguing that the English Bill of Rights, Anglo-
American tradition, and the text of the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” clause itself 
all support a proportionality requirement).  
Yet, some of the most prominent Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars have 
argued that the Punishments Clause was intended to forbid only barbaric methods of 
punishment, not disproportionate punishments. Within the Court’s own 
jurisprudence, this criticism began with Justice White’s dissent in Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 397 (1910) (White, J., dissenting). More than eighty years later, 
Justice Scalia would draw upon Justice White’s dissent in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 966-85, 991-93 (1991), as well as a prominent law review article by 
Professor Anthony Granucci, to argue that the Court’s textual basis for proportionality 
review was unsupported. See Anthony D. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969). 
 53 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367). 
 54 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 598 (1977) (observing that “[r]ape is 
without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and 
of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which 
does involve the unjustified taking of human life”). 
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1. Procedural Surplus 
The Court first imposed a substantive constraint on punishment in 
1910 in Weems v. United States,55 when it rejected a legislatively 
authorized sentence of fifteen years of hard labor and permanent loss 
of civil liberties for minor offenses by a governmental employee. A half 
century later, the Court relied on Weems when it articulated for the 
first time in Trop v. Dulles that the meaning of “cruel and unusual” 
punishments was not static, but evolved over time, consistent with 
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”56 The “evolving standards of decency test” 
subsequently became the Court’s threshold inquiry when it reviewed 
challenges to punishment,57 and has traditionally involved 
consideration of relevant state legislation and practices, and the views 
of entities with relevant expertise.58 The Court follows this analysis 
with the application of its “independent judgment,” assessing, in 
essence, whether it agrees with the national consensus.59 Here, the 
Court weighs the culpability of the offender or offense against the 
severity of the punishment and then considers whether the particular 
sentencing practice can be justified by any of the standard theories of 
punishment.60 
 
 55 Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81. 
 56 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).  
 57 Id. The test has been heavily criticized. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The 
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 88 n.200 (1989) (“The preferences of the 
majority should not determine the nature of the [E]ighth [A]mendment or of any 
other constitutional right.”); Stinneford, supra note 44, at 905 (criticizing the test’s 
limited protection for criminal offenders because it “rarely yields an unambiguous 
showing of societal consensus against a given punishment, for virtually all 
punishments reviewed by the Supreme Court enjoy significant public support”); 
David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 
868, 872 (2009) (noting that, if society were to pivot toward a “a large-scale 
movement toward executing juveniles or the insane,” the Court would have to deem 
such punishments proportional). 
 58 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-65 (2005) (calculating a 
“national consensus” against juvenile death penalty by considering which states allow 
and prohibit such sentences); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312, 317 (2002) 
(discussing the reliance on state legislation as the “clearest and most reliable objective 
evidence of contemporary values”). 
 59 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (defining the evolving standards of decency 
inquiry as beginning with a “review of objective indicia of consensus,” followed by an 
“exercise of [the Court’s] own independent judgment”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 
(concluding that the Court’s independent evaluation of the propriety of executing the 
mentally handicapped “reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment of the 
legislatures that have recently addressed the matter”). 
 60 E.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19 (concluding that the diminished culpability of 
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In the half century after Weems was decided, the Court invoked its 
substantive proportionality analysis just once, holding in 1962 in 
Robinson v. California that a ninety-day sentence of incarceration for 
the offense of addiction to narcotics was excessive.61 While the assault 
on capital punishment in the 1960s and 1970s included additional 
substantive and procedural challenges to punishment, the Court 
responded with rules that were almost exclusively procedural. 
Between 1970 and 2000, the Court issued dozens of rulings placing 
procedural constraints on the imposition of the death penalty, limiting 
the discriminatory selection of capital jurors,62 invalidating capital 
sentencing schemes which foreclosed the consideration of mitigating 
evidence,63 prohibiting judges from excluding such evidence from 
capital sentencing decisions,64 limiting prosecutorial efforts to 
mischaracterize the scope of appellate review,65 and invalidating limits 
on testimony regarding the availability of parole,66 for example. But 
the Court rejected several substantive challenges to capital 
punishment as a practice,67 issuing just three substantive decisions 
over the course of three decades — prohibiting the death penalty for 
the rape of an adult in 1977 in Coker v. Georgia,68 prohibiting the 
death penalty for those who were not major participants in the offense 
in 1982 in Enmund v. Florida,69 and prohibiting the death penalty for 
those declared clinically “insane” in 1986 in Ford v. Wainwright.70 
 
mentally handicapped offenders prevents justifiable exercise of the death penalty). 
 61 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676-77 (1962) (finding that “[e]ven one 
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a 
common cold”). 
 62 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-23 (1968). 
 63 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976).  
 64 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982); see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 65 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 (1985). 
 66 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1994). 
 67 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (rejecting an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to execution of juveniles who were sixteen and seventeen years 
old at the time of the offense); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (rejecting 
an Eighth Amendment challenge to execution of persons with mental retardation); 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 317-19 (1987) (rejecting Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims that the death penalty was imposed in an impermissibly arbitrary 
manner). See generally Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 9, at 402-
03 (arguing that the Court’s excessively procedural focus on death penalty law during 
the two decades post-Furman v. Georgia had “wrought the worst of all possible 
worlds”). 
 68 433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977).  
 69 458 U.S. 782, 797, 806 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not 
permit the death penalty for individuals who did not themselves kill, attempt to kill, 
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2. “Death Is Different” 
Through much of the twentieth century, the Court also took a much 
different approach to non-capital cases, refusing to apply the robust 
proportionality analysis that it utilized in the capital context and 
instead applying a “narrow” proportionality inquiry that asked only 
whether the sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to the offense.71 
This standard was rarely met — as long as the state had a “reasonable 
basis for believing” that the sentence in question served some 
penological goal, the Court upheld the punishment.72 
In 1980 in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court was for the first time explicit 
about its “death is different” approach to proportionality review, 
observing that outside the death penalty context, “successful 
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been 
exceedingly rare.”73 In Rummel, the Court upheld the imposition of a 
life sentence under Texas’ recidivist statute for a defendant who was 
convicted of three non-violent felonies over a period of fifteen years,74 
and two years later, in Hutto v. Davis, affirmed two consecutive 
sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to distribute and 
distribution of nine ounces of marijuana.75 Yet, in 1983, in Solem v. 
Helm, the Court unexpectedly reversed as disproportionate a life 
without parole sentence for a repeat non-violent offender who had 
passed bad checks,76 and made the surprising claim that 
proportionality review does in fact apply to term-of-years sentences.77 
Nonetheless, the Court refused to overrule Rummel.78 
In 1991, the Court reversed course yet again in Harmelin v. 
Michigan, when it upheld a life without parole sentence for a first-time 
drug offender.79 In rejecting the defendant’s argument that a sentence 
of life without parole could not be imposed without a consideration of 
 
or intend to kill). 
 70 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). 
 71 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995, 998-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between 
crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.”). 
 72 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-30 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 73 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). 
 74 Id. at 263. 
 75 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-72 (1982) (per curiam). 
 76 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 278 (1983). 
 77 Id. at 278-79. 
 78 Id. at 304 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 79 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991). 
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mitigating factors, the Court made clear that it would not require 
individualized sentencing in non-capital cases. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia also argued that Solem v. Helm was wrongly 
decided because the Eighth Amendment does not contain a 
proportionality guarantee.80 In his concurrence, however, Justice 
Kennedy disagreed, affirming that the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence recognizes a “narrow” proportionality requirement in 
non-capital cases which “forbids only extreme sentences that are 
‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”81 
All the while, sentences of unprecedented severity proliferated. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, every state and the federal 
government enacted laws that enhanced prosecutorial authority, 
reduced judicial discretion, created mandatory minimum sentences 
and made punishment more severe.82 More than half the states also 
adopted truth-in-sentencing laws, which prevented release from 
prison before an inmate had served at least eighty-five percent of his 
sentence, and three strikes laws, which required minimum terms of 
twenty-five years to life for third-time felons.83 The impact of these 
measures was unmistakable. Between 1970 and 2003, the U.S. prison 
population increased from 200,000 to 1.4 million.84 
B. Twenty-First Century Functionalism 
It was against this backdrop of substantive restraint, procedural 
surplus, and the reservation of truly rigorous proportionality review 
for capital cases alone that the Court in 2002 issued the first of five 
decisions that have, by almost any measure, transformed its modern 
proportionality jurisprudence. These decisions have several common 
characteristics. First and most critically, they were the Court’s first 
 
 80 Id. at 965. 
 81 Id. at 997-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained: 
All of these principles — the primacy of the legislature, the variety of 
legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the 
requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors — 
inform the final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme 
sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.  
Id. at 1001. 
 82 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975–
2025, at 3, 16, 202-05 (2015). 
 83 Id. at 224-25. 
 84 BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 3 (2006). 
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efforts in two decades to impose substantive constraints on 
punishment. Second, they were all categorical decisions — the 
sentences in question were disproportionately severe, the Court held, 
because the offenders as a category, by virtue of their status or 
offenses, were insufficiently culpable. The Court’s decisions in Graham 
and Miller also represented the first time the Court had ever placed a 
categorical restriction on life sentences. Finally, while the Court 
employed its standard two-step Eighth Amendment inquiry in each 
case, it deviated from its traditional “evolving standards” analysis in 
important ways. 
1. Substantive Limits 
The Court’s decisions in Atkins, Roper, Kennedy, and, to a lesser 
extent, Graham and Miller, were unequivocally substantive. In Atkins, 
the Supreme Court overruled its thirteen-year-old decision in Penry v. 
Lynaugh,85 and declared that the death penalty was unconstitutional 
for those who are “mentally retarded.”86 In doing so, the Court issued 
a categorical exemption from the death penalty for defendants who 
meet the clinical criteria for intellectual disability.87 “[T]he 
Constitution places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to 
take the life of [an intellectually disabled] offender,” the Court held.88 
Three years later, a sharply divided Court issued a comparable 
categorical ban in Roper,89 prohibiting the execution of juvenile 
offenders. In doing so, the Court overruled its 1989 decision in 
Stanford v. Kentucky and, for the first time, applied proportionality 
principles to juveniles as a class.90 Drawing upon the same categorical 
analysis that it employed in Atkins, the Court identified three 
fundamental features of youth that make juveniles constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of capital sentencing: immaturity 
and limited self-control; increased susceptibility to peer pressure and 
inability to escape criminogenic environments; and the transient 
 
 85 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 86 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002).  
 87 Id. at 317 n.22 (“The statutory definitions of mental retardation are not 
identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions . . . .”). 
 88 Id. at 321. 
 89 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551-54 (2005) (5–4 decision) (holding 
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution of a juvenile 
offender who had committed a capital crime). 
 90 Id. at 552. 
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nature of adolescent personality development.91 It would rely on these 
distinguishing features in both Graham and Miller. 
In Kennedy, the Court invoked its rationales in Coker92 and 
Enmund,93 prohibiting the death penalty for the crime of sexual assault 
on a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to 
result, in the victim’s death.94 Again, the Court based its categorical 
exemption on the defendant’s diminished culpability, not as a function 
of the defendant’s class or status, but rather his offense.95 
In Graham, the Court returned to Roper, holding that the same 
reduced culpability that precluded the State from imposing the death 
penalty on juveniles also precluded the State from sentencing juveniles 
who had not killed to the next harshest punishment — life without 
parole.96 Central to Graham’s holding was the Court’s determination 
that juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults, doubly so 
when they had not killed, and as a result, are categorically less 
deserving of the sentence of life without parole, a punishment which 
the Court expressly noted, in Graham, was akin to death for 
juveniles.97 The Court did not, of course, ban juvenile life without 
parole outright, something it could have, and perhaps should have, 
 
 91 See id. at 567-71 (discussing these three distinctive features of adolescence). 
Justice Kennedy’s decision to rely on a “categorical” rather than an “as-applied” 
approach was met with considerable opposition. Id. at 602-03 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). In her dissent, Justice O’Connor decried the Court’s use of a “categorical 
age-based rule” rather than an “individualized sentencing” methodology, id. 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting), while Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s “startling 
conclusion undermines the very foundations of our capital sentencing system, which 
entrusts juries with ‘mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy 
codification and that ‘buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system,’’” id. 
at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987)). 
 92 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that capital punishment for a 
crime of rape of an adult woman was grossly disproportionate and excessive 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
 93 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
does not permit the imposition of the death penalty for those who aid and abet a 
felony during the course of which a murder is committed). 
 94 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008). 
 95 See id. at 420-21. 
 96 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010). 
 97 See id. at 69, 74, 79 (“A young person who knows that he or she has no chance 
to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible 
individual. . . . A categorical rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that led to an 
offender’s crime is reinforced by the prison term.”). 
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done if it believed that such a punishment was itself substantively 
cruel.98 
Just two years later, the Court granted certiorari in the cases of 
Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs. Like Graham, Miller and 
Jackson were framed as categorical challenges to non-capital sentences, 
this time to the imposition of juvenile life without parole for the 
offense of homicide.99 Miller brought together “two strands” of Eighth 
Amendment precedent.100 Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan 
began with the Court’s “categorical” ban cases.101 Atkins, Kennedy, 
Roper and Graham were controlling, Justice Kagan explained, because 
each case banned a category of punishment because either the class of 
defendants was insufficiently culpable, or the class of conduct was 
insufficiently severe.102 
The second strand of cases included those “requiring that 
sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and 
the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”103 While 
Roper, Graham and Atkins focused principally on the vulnerability of 
the class of defendants in question, these other cases focused on the 
severity of the punishment, grafting an individualization requirement 
into capital sentencing because it is uniquely harsh.104 Because 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles “preclude a 
sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of 
 
 98 See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 28, at 416. 
 99 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Jackson v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) 
(No. 10-9647), 2011 WL 5322575, at 7 (“Graham confirmed [Jackson’s] basic 
submission that juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without parole could 
maintain categorical challenges to their sentences under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455 (2012) (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322568, at 8 (“[Miller] continued to raise his 
categorical challenge to the constitutionality of sentencing a fourteen-year-old child to 
life imprisonment without parole . . . .”). 
 100 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 2463-65. 
 103 Id. at 2463-64. 
 104 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293, 304 (1976) (citing 
consensus of jurisdictions rejecting mandatory death sentences as “unduly harsh and 
unworkably rigid”); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116-117 (1982) 
(holding “the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating evidence and weigh it 
against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances”); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
U.S. 325, 332 (1976) (noting “unacceptable severity of the common-law rule of 
automatic death sentences”). 
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characteristics and circumstances attendant to it,” they “pose[] too 
great a risk of disproportionate punishment,” Justice Kagan warned.105 
2. Different No Longer 
One of the most significant aspects of the Court’s decision in 
Graham was Justice Kennedy’s acknowledgement that it was nearly 
impossible to establish a constitutional violation under the Court’s 
“narrow,” non-capital review, and his application of the Court’s 
“categorical” prohibition cases to a non-capital sentence.106 The 
Graham Court also explicitly dispensed with its traditional stance of 
penal agnosticism in non-capital cases. Just seven years earlier, in the 
companion cases of Ewing v. California and Lockyer v. Andrade, the 
Court affirmed that, as long as the state has a reasonable basis for 
believing that the sentence in question serves some penological goal, 
the Court would not find it grossly disproportionate.107 The Court 
abruptly reversed course in Graham, however, holding that the 
sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide 
offenses, like the death penalty in Atkins and Roper, was 
disproportionate because it did not advance any legitimate goals of 
punishment. Juveniles who did not kill had “twice diminished moral 
culpability,” Justice Kennedy noted, and none of the rationales for 
punishment could justify imposing upon them a sentence of life 
without parole.108 The significance of the Court’s methodological 
approach was immediately evident to scholars, advocates and 
jurists.109 Graham had all but eviscerated the Court’s “death is 
 
 105 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 2469. 
 106 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60-62 (2010) (“[A] threshold comparison 
between the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime does not advance the 
analysis. Here, in addressing the question presented, the appropriate analysis is the 
one used in cases that involved the categorical approach.”). 
 107 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-30 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 
63, 76-77 (2003). 
 108 Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-70. 
 109 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News — and Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 
54, (2010) (suggesting that Kennedy’s approach in Graham offered a more unified 
approach to proportionality review than the Court’s earlier “two-track distinction 
between death and prison sentences”); Smith & Cohen, supra note 6 (describing the 
Graham Court’s departure from prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and its 
implications); Steiker & Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The Supreme Court 
Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-off Approaches to Eighth Amendment 
Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010) (discussing the implications 
of the Graham decision for capital and noncapital Eighth Amendment challenges). 
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different” approach to proportionality review,110 something that 
became abundantly clear in Miller. 
In the aftermath of Graham, questions abounded about whether the 
Court was prepared to take the next logical step and ban juvenile life 
without parole outright.111 Though the Miller Court declined to do so, 
Justice Kagan picked up where Graham left off methodologically, 
again applying the Courts robust “categorical” approach to a non-
capital sentence. 
3. Methodological Expansion 
While in each of the five cases the Court employed its standard two-
step analysis, it also deviated from its standard inquiry. In Atkins, the 
Court acknowledged that just eighteen of the thirty-eight states that 
retained the death penalty prohibited the execution of those with an 
intellectual disability, but emphasized that the bans had been 
recent.112 “It is not so much the number of these States that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change,” the Court 
noted.113 The Court then noted that several professional organizations, 
religious communities and other nations also condemned the practice, 
which added to the growing consensus that the punishment was cruel 
and unusual.114 
The Court relied on international consensus even more heavily in 
Roper.115 Though Justice Kennedy maintained that something akin to a 
“national consensus” against the death penalty for juveniles was 
emerging in the United States,116 he emphasized that such consensus 
had already emerged in other countries,117 citing to article 37 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
 
 110 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 103 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas 
complained that the majority’s reliance on its capital proportionality analysis 
“impose[s] a categorical proportionality rule banning life-without-parole sentences not 
just in this case, but in every case involving a juvenile nonhomicide offender, no 
matter what the circumstances.” Id. at 105. 
 111 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and 
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & 
INEQ. 263, 263-64 (2013) (discussing “how Graham altered the Court’s non-death 
penalty proportionality framework . . . of young non-homicide offenders”). 
 112 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342-44 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 113 Id. at 315 (majority opinion).  
 114 Id. at 316 n.21. 
 115 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005). 
 116 Id. at 564-67. 
 117 Id. at 576-77. 
  
2017] Implementing Proportionality 983 
expressly prohibits juvenile executions and which every country in the 
world has ratified, except the United States and Somalia.118 The Court 
had referenced this type of evidence only in passing in prior 
decisions.119 
In Graham, Justice Kennedy based his conclusion that there was 
“objective indicia of [a] national consensus” against sentencing 
juvenile non-homicide offenders to life without parole not on the 
legality of the sentence, which thirty-seven states and the federal 
government allowed, but on “actual sentencing practices.”120 The 
sentence was rarely imposed, the Court noted.121 Finally, in Miller, 
Justice Kagan acknowledged the Court’s traditional objective indicia 
analysis, but then brushed quickly past, turning almost immediately to 
the Court’s independent judgment.122 
The Court’s independent judgment analysis in these cases also broke 
with precedent. In every case but Kennedy, the Court invoked both 
psychological and neurological evidence to bolster its diminished 
culpability analysis. In Atkins, the Court observed that the very nature 
of intellectual disability — including a reduced ability to understand, 
reason, communicate, control impulses, and learn from mistakes — 
categorically reduced the criminal culpability of such defendants and 
undermined the death penalty’s penological purposes.123 In Roper, 
Graham and Miller, the Court cited to amicus briefs filed by the 
American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric 
Association, which argued that the developmental differences between 
juveniles and adults rendered juveniles inherently less culpable and 
therefore less deserving of the ultimate punishment.124 
 
 118 Id. at 576. 
 119 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality 
opinion) (referencing the abolition of juvenile death penalty “by other nations that 
share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western 
European community”). 
 120 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2010). 
 121 Id. at 64-67, 72. 
 122 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470-72 (2012). 
 123 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-18 nn.23–24 (2002). 
 124 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005) (discussing the numerous 
developmental differences between juveniles and adults raised by Simmons and his 
amici and concluding that these “demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with 
reliability be classified among the worst offenders”); Brief for American Medical Ass’n 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) 
(“This Court has concluded that . . . adolescents who are under age 16 . . . exhibit 
characteristics . . . that categorically disqualify them from the death penalty. Offenders 
at age 16 and 17 exhibit those characteristics as well.”); Brief for American 
Psychological Ass’n & Missouri Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting 
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A number of scholars have described these cases as the 
contemporary revitalization of the Court’s substantive proportionality 
jurisprudence, which had been virtually dormant since its 1986 
decision in Ford v. Wainright.125 It was not that the Court had 
undertaken an unprecedented power grab, many scholars maintained, 
it was that the Court’s “expansion of the Eighth Amendment . . . [had] 
simply restore[d] an absent Court to its proper role of policing 
legislative overreaching.”126 Collectively, the five decisions reinforced 
the constitutional principle of proportional punishment, and in the 
case of Graham and Miller, the social reintegration of offenders and 
individualized, discretionary sentencing.127 The Court’s reasoning 
might one day provide a basis to challenge the sentences of certain 
categories of adult offenders,128 including the mentally ill,129 and other 
juvenile processing130 and sentencing decisions.131 
 
Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“The unformed nature of adolescent 
character makes execution of 16- and 17-year-olds fall short of the purposes this 
Court has articulated for capital punishment. Developmentally immature decision-
making, paralleled by immature neurological development, diminishes an adolescent’s 
blameworthiness.”); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5 (citing to a brief by the 
American Psychological Association); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing to briefs filed by 
the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association). 
 125 See, e.g., Smith & Cohen, supra note 6, at 86 (“Graham contains the ingredients 
to be of transformative significance to the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”); Steiker & Steiker, Lessons from Substance, supra note 6, at 723, 732, 
735 (noting that, because Atkins was the first Supreme Court case to find an American 
criminal practice excessive in the absence of an overwhelming legislative consensus, it 
had “opened the path not only to other proportionality limitations on the reach of the 
death penalty, but also to the prospect of judicial abolition of the death penalty 
itself”); Steiker, U.S.: Roper v. Simmons, supra note 6, at 164-65 (noting that Roper 
“appears to be part of a larger effort to regulate” the American death penalty system 
and “provides a blueprint not simply for increased judicial regulation of the capital 
practices but also for judicial abolition of the American death penalty altogether”).  
 126 William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 
1054 (2013) (symposium keynote remarks). See generally Gertner, supra note 7 
(proposing answers to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence questions raised at the 
University of Missouri School of Law symposium). 
 127 Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 
78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 1088-89 (2013). 
 128 Id.  
 129 See, e.g., Shin, supra note 13, at 477-81 (discussing how excessive punishments 
are judged by currently prevailing standards and how defendants with diminished 
capacity are not likely to be deterred); Winick, supra note 13, at 819-23 (2009) 
(discussing how the death penalty may be a disproportionate punishment for 
defendants with mental illness because it may not meet the penological goals of 
retribution and deterrence). 
 130 See generally Arya, supra note 14 (suggesting that lawyers use Graham to 
challenge the constitutionality of adult court transfer statutes). 
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II. PROPORTIONALITY SLIPPAGE 
What has received much less attention, however, is whether these 
decisions have achieved in practice what they promised in principle. 
While several scholars have studied the implementation of the 
individual decisions,132 none have yet examined the implementation of 
the Court’s modern proportionality jurisprudence in the aggregate. 
While the seventy-four inmates whose sentences were implicated by 
Kennedy and Roper have obtained relief,133 a review of the states’ 
implementation of Atkins, Miller, and to a lesser extent, Graham 
reveals that the decisions simply have not produced in practice what 
they promised in principle. This constitutional slippage can be 
attributed both to the structural features of state criminal justice 
 
 131 See, e.g., William W. Berry III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 
353-56 (2014) (arguing for extension of Miller rule to all cases where defendant faces 
death-in-custody sentence); Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 49-
52 (2013) (positing that Miller undermines the legitimacy of mandatory sex offender 
registries for juveniles); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now 
the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 59-60 (2013) (arguing that Miller calls 
into question current juvenile transfer laws); Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are 
Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 101-03 
(2013) (suggesting Miller requires states to rethink not just sentencing but modes of 
incarceration and rehabilitation altogether); Sarah A. Kellogg, Note, Just Grow Up 
Already: The Diminished Culpability of Juvenile Gang Members After Miller v. Alabama, 
55 B.C. L. REV. 265, 292-95 (2014) (noting that Miller calls into question general 
legislation designed to address gang crime as it applies to juveniles); Andrea Wood, 
Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults After Graham 
and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1482-85 (2012) (suggesting that the Court’s decision 
in Miller affirms that “youth matters in sentencing”).  
 132 See, e.g., Chang et al., supra note 17, at 91-103 (examining the implementation 
of Miller); Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. 
Alabama and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1087-88 (2014); Drinan, 
supra note 17, at 64-82 (analyzing the implementation of Graham); Mary Price, 
Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums: What Federal Lawmakers Should Take from Miller v. 
Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV. 1147, 1154-56 (2013); Therese A. Savona, The Growing Pains 
of Graham v. Florida: Deciphering Whether Lengthy Term-of-Years Sentences for Juvenile 
Defendants Can Equate to the Unconstitutional Sentence of Life Without the Possibility of 
Parole, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 182, 197-210 (2012); Steiker & Steiker, Lessons from 
Substance, supra note 6, at 724-31 (examining the implementation of Atkins). 
 133 Two inmates were serving the sentence proscribed in Kennedy — Patrick Kennedy 
and another Louisiana inmate. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2644 (2008). Their 
sentences were commuted to life without parole in 2008. See Bill Mears, Child Rapists Can’t 
Be Executed, Supreme Court Rules, CNN (June 25, 2008, 8:02 PM EDT), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/06/25/scotus.child.rape/index.html. Seventy-two inmates in 
seven states — Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and 
Virginia — were impacted by Roper, and all of them have been resentenced to life without 
parole. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2004: YEAR END REPORT, (Dec. 
2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/DPICyer04.pdf. 
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processes and also to a dearth of procedural prescription in the 
decisions themselves. 
A. Procedural Evasion 
At a rudimentary level, political scientists define the implementation 
of a judicial decision as the process through which political authorities 
carry out the action (or avoid the action) called for (or prohibited) in a 
court ruling.134 This process flows through four primary populations, 
they posit: the decision-maker (the court); the interpreting population 
(lower court judges, executive actors, and policy-makers, for 
example); the implementing population (again, judges, executive 
actors, policy-makers, and depending on the mandate, front-line 
bureaucrats); and the consumer population (in the Eighth 
Amendment context, defendants and inmates).135 
Because the implementation of a Supreme Court mandate is 
especially diffuse, the interpreting and implementation populations 
have considerable opportunity to alter the scope of the decision or 
evade it altogether. Lower court judges might attempt to block the 
decision of a higher court, avoid applying it on procedural grounds, or 
use their interpretive power to restrict or limit the application of the 
decision.136 Members of the implementing population — legislators, 
prosecutors and bureaucrats, for example — may acknowledge a 
decision but fail to address it, revise a statute but to do so in a way that 
avoids some the consequences of the decision, fail to make 
organizational changes to comply with the decision, or make 
“cosmetic” changes to give the appearance of conformity with the 
order.137 As Stephanos Bibas and Richard Bierschbach have written, 
“[t]he Court’s constitutional regulation of the death penalty has . . . 
resulted in a system in which capital sentencing determinations are 
filtered through multiple viewpoints that act as veto gates, giving each 
actor a chance to influence the process and kick the defendant out of 
the pipeline.”138 
 
 134 See, e.g., Kapiszewski & Taylor, supra note 18, at 806-07; Spriggs, supra note 
18, at 587. 
 135 See generally Bradley C. Canon, Courts and Policy: Compliance, Implementation, 
and Impact, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 435, 435-66 (John B. 
Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991). 
 136 BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPACT 37-43 (2d ed. 1998). 
 137 Id. at 62-72. 
 138 Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 28, at 409. 
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Commentators have long recognized that the law in principle is 
rarely the law in practice. In 1930, Karl Llewellyn distinguished 
between “paper” rules and “real” rules;139 a half century later, Larry 
Sager explored the gaps between “true” and enforced constitutional 
rights;140 and in 1999, Dan Farber talked about “slippage” — the gap 
between what law mandates and what actually happens.141 States’ 
implementation of Atkins, Graham and Miller suggests that the 
theoretical prospects of “slippage” have materialized in many 
instances. As explored in Part II B,142 this was all but guaranteed by 
the minimalism of the decisions themselves, which left it to the States 
to answer important definitional questions about who should and 
should not receive the proscribed punishments; to replace newly 
unconstitutional statutes or sentencing schemes with constitutional 
alternatives; to filter petitions for relief through their post-conviction 
apparatuses; and in the cases of Graham and Miller, to confer 
sentencing and release authority on judges, juries and parole boards. 
These requirements have run head long into four structural and 
cultural features of many states’ criminal justice processes: cultural 
resistance to drawing upon scientific expertise in criminal justice 
policy-making; elected officials’ apparent belief that “tough on crime” 
policies continue to pay political dividends; the procedural rigidity of 
state (and federal) post-conviction processes; and the lack of robust 
parole systems. The ensuing friction has meant that many of the 
inmates ostensibly eligible for some form of relief continue to serve 
their infirm sentences, others have been resentenced to functionally 
equivalent sentences, and several states have not taken any steps to 
revise their infirm statutes. The net effect has been, in the words of 
Carol and Jordan Steiker, the states’ “procedural evasion of [the 
Court’s] new substantive rights.”143 
 
 139 Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence — The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 
431, 447-48 (1930). 
 140 See Sager, supra note 19, at 1214-15.  
 141 See Farber, supra note 19, at 298; see also John Rappaport, Second-Order 
Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 249-50 (2015) (in the criminal 
justice enforcement context, “[s]lippage here refers to the risk that political policy 
makers will write loose rules” because they devalue the right and interests of criminal 
defendants).  
 142 See infra Part II.B. 
 143 Steiker & Steiker, Lessons from Substance, supra note 6, at 731. This is not to say 
that these decisions have been entirely unproductive. In the juvenile sentencing arena, 
Miller has prompted the abolition of juvenile life without parole in nine states. John R. 
Mills et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid 
Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 552 (2016).  
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1. Eschewing Expertise 
Unlike much of Western Europe, criminal justice policy-making in 
most U.S. states remains highly politicized, and legislators rarely rely 
on autonomous, politically insulated experts.144 Thus, when faced 
with the critical definitional questions left open by Atkins, Graham and 
Miller — how to define intellectual disability, what constitutes a non-
homicide offense, and which juveniles are sufficiently irredeemable 
that they should receive life without parole sentences — many states 
have responded with non-scientific and ad hoc legislative and judicial 
schemes. 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court embraced two clinical definitions of 
intellectual disability, one used by the American Association on 
Mental Retardation (AAMR) (now called now the American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 
(AAIDD)),145 and the other utilized by the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR).146 Both define intellectual disability as 
characterized by (1) sub-average intellectual functioning with (2) 
concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning that (3) manifest during 
childhood.147 As long as state definitions of intellectual disability 
“generally conform[ed]” with these clinical measures, they would be 
upheld, the Atkins Court said.148 
Yet, fourteen years after Atkins was decided, courts and legislatures 
in the twenty149 affected states continue to debate how to define 
intellectual disability, how to measure it, and how to allocate burdens 
of proof. Notably, few states have relied on expert input to develop 
definitional thresholds and processes.150 While most states define 
 
 144 David Garland, Penality and the Penal State, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 475, 484, 493-508 
(2014). 
 145 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (citing AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL 
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF 
SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)). 
 146 Id. (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., text rev. 2000)); see also David DeMatteo, Geoffrey 
Marczyk, & Michele Pich, A National Survey of State Legislation Defining Mental 
Retardation: Implications for Policy and Practice After Atkins, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 781, 
783-84 (2007). 
 147 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. 
 148 See id. at 308 n.3, 317 & 317 n.22.  
 149 See id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that at the time of Atkins, only 47% 
of states that employed capital punishment barred execution of the mentally 
handicapped). 
 150 See generally DeMatteo, Marczyk & Pich, supra note 146 (noting that many 
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intellectual disability through some combination of the three 
prongs,151 many add very little specificity.152 Thus, while state 
standards may appear to comport with prevailing scientific measures, 
they are often so vague and generalized that they produce considerable 
variation when they are applied.153 
There is also significant variation in the weight given to IQ scores 
and the development of cut-offs. Arkansas, for example, has 
established a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation when a 
defendant’s IQ is 65 or lower;154 Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Nebraska, and North Carolina utilize a cut-off of 70;155 and Colorado, 
Georgia, and Missouri do not utilize a cut-off of any kind.156 Studies 
suggest that state deviations from clinical definitions of intellectual 
disability have created a substantial relief gap because courts have 
been forced to rely on historical stereotypes rather than clinical 
standards and diagnostics.157 
 
states “use criteria for mental retardation that are not entirely consistent with accepted 
clinical standards”); Natalie A. Pifer, The Scientific and the Social in Implementing 
Atkins v. Virginia, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1036 (2015) (arguing that “drawing 
boundaries around intellectual disability in capital cases requires law to grapple with 
fluid scientific and social constructs”). 
 151 See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 15-24-2 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
753(K)(3); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (2017); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1101 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3)(D) (2017); 
FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (2017); IDAHO CODE § 
19- 2515A(1)(A) (2017); IND. CODE § 35-36-9-2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-
12b01(D) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (2017); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 905.5.1(H) (2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 5001(3) (2017); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 123B, § 1 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1100b(12) (2017); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 41-21-61(F) (2017); MO. STAT. § 630.005(20) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 174.098(7) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(A) (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 701.10b (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-20-30(12) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-13- 203(A) (2017); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(15-A) (2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15A-102 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 146 (2017); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2)(a) (2017); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 25-5-102(b)(xx) (2017). 
 152 See DeMatteo, Marczyk, & Pich, supra note 146, at 786-87, 789. 
 153 Pifer, supra note 150, at 1039 (citing John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & 
Christopher Seeds, An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and its Application in 
Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625 (2009)); see Julie C. Duvall & Richard J. Morris, 
Assessing Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases: Critical Issues for Psychology and 
Psychological Practice, 37 PROF. PSYCHOL. 658, 658 (2006). 
 154 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2017). 
 155 See DeMatteo, Marczyk, & Pich, supra note 146, at 785-87. 
 156 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) 
(2017); MO. STAT. § 565.030(6) (2017). 
 157 See, e.g., John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher Seeds, An Empirical 
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Like Atkins, Graham spawned considerable debate over definitions 
— in this case, what constitutes a “‘nonhomicide’ offense”158 — how 
to identify the class of individuals to whom the decision applies,159 and 
what the appropriate replacement sentence should be.160 Even though 
Graham expressly relied on adolescent brain science and the 
behavioral features of youth that make juveniles neurologically 
different from adults (immaturity and limited self-control; increased 
susceptibility to peer pressure and inability to escape criminogenic 
environments; and the transient nature of adolescent personality 
development), many states do not incorporate science into law-
making and sentencing. In 2012, the Chairman of the Texas House 
Corrections Committee acknowledged that “[t]he brain development 
studies have been part of the discussion and will continue to be,” but 
then went on to say: “the main issue we’re dealing with is providing 
proper security. . . . If you’re getting assaulted by a youth, it doesn’t 
make much difference to you whether his brain will not fully develop 
until he’s twenty-five. We have to have a safe environment in these 
(lockups) to have any success at programming and rehabilitation.”161 
The implementation of Miller v. Alabama has also been stymied by 
definitional questions. In Miller, the Court held that sentencing 
juveniles to mandatory life without parole (juvenile life without 
parole) violates the Eighth Amendment because it precludes the 
sentencer from taking into account the juvenile’s age and other 
 
Look at Atkins v. Virginia and its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 
626 (2009); Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing 
Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and 
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 
818-24 (2007); James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty: The Road 
from Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003). 
 158 See, e.g., Arrington v. State, 113 So. 3d 20, 22-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding that felony murder constitutes a “homicide offense”).  
 159 Identifying those eligible for relief under Graham proved especially difficult in 
Florida — so much so that in 2010, the Florida Bar Foundation awarded Barry 
University Law School a $100,000 grant to “address the legal and policy questions 
raised by the Graham decision, as well as individual client needs.” Drinan, supra note 
17, at 53 n.5 (citing Nancy Kinnally, Foundation Supports Efforts to Ensure Fair 
Sentencing for Juveniles, FLA. B. NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010), https://thefloridabarfoundation. 
org/foundation-supports-efforts-to-ensure-fair-sentencing-for-juveniles/). 
 160 The Florida Supreme Court recently overturned as excessive the sentences of 
two juveniles who were given 70- and 90-year terms. See Gridine v. Florida, No. 
SC12-1223, 674-75 (Fla. 2015); Henry v. Florida, No. SC12-578, 679-80 (Fla. 2015). 
 161 Mike Ward, Report on Adolescent Brains Hits Nerve in Criminal Justice Debate, 
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN (Aug. 6, 2012, 8:59 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/ 
state-regional-govt-politics/report-on-adolescent-brains-hits-nerve-in-criminal/nRNKT.  
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mitigating factors.162 At the time of Miller, twenty-eight jurisdictions 
authorized mandatory juvenile life without parole, fifteen jurisdictions 
allowed for discretionary juvenile life without parole, and eight 
jurisdictions had no form of juvenile life without parole.163 Miller thus 
invalidated sentencing statutes in twenty-eight states, calling into 
question the sentences of more than 2,100 inmates.164 
Yet, while the Court struck down the infirm statutes, ordered states 
to undertake “individualized sentencing” that accounted for the 
“mitigating qualities of youth” before sentencing juveniles to the 
harshest punishments,165 and declared that such offenders must be 
afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,”166 it said 
nothing about when, how, and with what states should replace their 
proscribed laws. As with Atkins and Graham, many states have 
resorted to ad hoc legislative and judicial schemes.167 
2. Staying Tough 
Despite a broad-based consensus that criminal justice reform is 
needed, elected officials in nearly every state continue to benefit 
politically — or believe they benefit politically — from taking tough-
on-crime approaches to criminal justice policy-making and 
sentencing.168 While voters have taken direct steps to curb mass 
incarceration,169 state legislators and executive branch officials simply 
have not. As Michael Tonry recently observed, no state has repealed a 
three-strikes, truth-in-sentencing, or adult life without parole law.170 
“No statutory changes have fundamentally altered the laws and 
policies that created the existing American sentencing system, mass 
incarceration, and the human, social, and economic costs they 
engendered,” he writes.171 The implementation of Atkins, Graham and 
Miller bears this out in two primary ways. Many states have taken 
 
 162 See Joshua Rovner, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2016), http:// 
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-Life-Without-Parole.pdf. 
 163 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 n.10 (2012). 
 164 See id. at 2467, 2471. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 2469. 
 167 See Chang et al., supra note 17, at 101-03. 
 168 See Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Ten-Step Blueprint for 
Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 503, 506-07 (2014). 
 169 See id. at 509 (citing California referendums narrowing three strikes and 
increasing opportunities for probation). 
 170 Id. at 506. 
 171 Id. at 510. 
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highly restrictive and punitive remedial approaches, and some states 
simply have not acted. 
In an effort to limit Atkins claims, several states have created 
stringent burden-shifting procedures and standards of proof that 
effectively deny protection to any inmate who cannot bring forward an 
iron-clad claim. Texas courts, for example, have openly questioned 
whether those classified as “mentally retarded” are sufficiently less 
culpable to deserve exemption from the death penalty and devised 
their own test for mental retardation, which departed significantly 
from established professional standards.172 Georgia requires a capital 
defendant to establish her mental retardation “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” to be exempt from execution.173 
In Florida, recent litigation has spawned over contentions by 
prosecutors that the IQ scores of African Americans and Latinos/as 
should be “ethnically adjusted” upward to account for cultural 
disadvantage.174 Prosecutors in Texas, Alabama, Tennessee, Missouri, 
California, Pennsylvania, and Ohio have made the same arguments.175 
Collectively, these measures have had “the undeniable consequence of 
permitting the execution of persons with mental retardation.”176 
The starkest evidence of the impact of states’ ad hoc responses to 
Atkins may be in the individual stories. A recent study showed that, in 
the decade after Atkins was decided, just 371 of the 4,819 (7.7%) death 
row inmates or capital defendants who could have raised Atkins claims 
did so, and, of these, roughly half prevailed.177 One of those who did 
not prevail was Marvin Wilson. In 2004, Mr. Wilson’s IQ was 
measured at sixty-one, and he had multiple adaptive deficits.178 At age 
 
 172 See Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (suggesting 
that categorical ban should be limited to those offenders with mental retardation who 
would be deemed worthy of protection by a consensus of “Texas citizens”); see also Ex 
parte Rodriguez, 164 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (Cochran, J., 
concurring) (stating that the defendant’s scores did not necessarily show mental 
retardation because the verbal IQ test “is really culturally based”). 
 173 See, e.g., Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 621 (Ga. 2003). 
 174 See Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 525 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (stating that 
the defendant’s low IQ scores could be discounted because “IQ tests tend to 
underestimate particularly the intelligence of African-Americans”), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 164 (2011). 
 175 Robert M. Sanger, IQ, Intelligence Tests, “Ethnic Adjustments” and Atkins, 65 AM. 
U. L. REV. 87, 109 (2015). 
 176 Steiker & Steiker, Lessons from Substance, supra note 6, at 729. 
 177 Blume et al., A Tale of Two, supra note 22, 396-97, 396 n.20. 
 178 Pifer, supra note 150, at 1036 (citing Andrew Cohen, supra note 24; John 
Rudolf, Marvin Wilson Execution: Texas Puts Man with 61 IQ to Death, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/07/marvin-
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fifty-four, he reportedly sucked his thumb and could not tie his 
shoes.179 Mr. Wilson bore the signs of convergence of all three Atkins 
prongs: sub-average intellectual functioning with concurrent, 
substantial deficits in adaptive functioning manifesting in 
childhood.180 Yet, Mr. Wilson’s Atkins claim was denied by Texas 
courts under the seven non-scientific factors set forth by the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals in 2004 in Ex parte Briseno.181 According to 
Texas courts, Mr. Wilson did not meet Texas’ definition of intellectual 
disability and, in August 2012, he was executed.182 
Another inmate who did not prevail on his Atkins claim was Ramiro 
Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez had IQ scores as low as 52, 54 and 57, but 
the prosecution’s expert, who had not in fact tested him, argued that 
Mr. Hernandez’s test scores should be measured against others of 
Mexican heritage and not the standardized norm of the community as 
a whole.183 The case eventually made its way to the Fifth Circuit, 
where the Court agreed that, “[w]hen scaled to Mexican norms, [Mr. 
Hernandez] scored exactly [seventy] on the one . . . test.”184 Mr. 
Hernandez filed a writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court 
seeking review of Texas’ use of ethnic IQ adjustments,185 but the 
 
wilson-execution-texas_n_1753968.html). 
 179 Pifer, supra note 150, at 1.  
 180 Id. 
 181 See, e.g., Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“There 
are, however, some other evidentiary factors which factfinders in the criminal trial 
context might also focus upon in weighing evidence as indicative of mental 
retardation or of a personality disorder: (1) Did those who knew the person best 
during the developmental stage — his family, friends, teachers, employers, and 
authorities — think he was mentally retarded at that time, and if so, act in accordance 
with that determination?; (2) Has the person formulated plans and carried them 
through or is his conduct impulsive?; (3) Does his conduct show leadership or does it 
show that he is led around by others?; (4) Is his conduct in response to external 
stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?; (5) 
Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions, or 
do his responses wander from subject to subject?; (6) Can the person hide facts or lie 
effectively in his own or others’ interests?; [and] (7) Putting aside any heinousness or 
gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense 
require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?”). 
 182 See Pifer, supra note 150, at 1036.  
 183 See Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x 531, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1760 (2014). 
 184 Id. at 539. 
 185 Hernandez v. Stephens, 134 S. Ct. 1760, 1760 (2014).  
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Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2014 without opinion.186 Mr. 
Hernandez was executed in April 2014.187 
While the majority of the 123188 inmates eligible for relief under 
Graham have received new sentences, many of those sentences exceed 
the inmate’s life expectancy. The Youth Defense Institute at Barry 
University School of Law in Florida estimated that approximately 
seventy-five inmates have been resentenced under Graham, but in 
thirty of the cases, the new sentences exceeded fifty years.189 Florida’s 
response to Graham has been especially punitive and inconsistent. In 
the wake of Graham, Florida’s Second, Fourth and Fifth District 
Courts held that sentences of 60,190 65,191 90,192 100,193 and 130 
years194 did not violate the Eighth Amendment, while the First District 
extended Graham to lengthy term-of-years sentences that amount to 
de facto life sentences.195 The range of inmates and resentencing 
options is set forth below.  
 
 186 Id.  
 187 Sanger, supra note 175, at 116 (citing Ian Smith, How Race-Based IQ Handicapping 
Led to A Man’s Execution, DAILY CALLER (Aug. 28, 2014, 7:38 PM), http:// 
dailycaller.com/2014/08/28/how-race-based-iq-handicapping-led-to-a-mans-execution). 
 188 Based on the evidence before it, the Graham Court determined that, at the time 
of the decision, there were 123 non-homicide juvenile offenders serving life without 
parole sentences nationwide and seventy-seven of them were in Florida prisons. 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 64 (2010) (“Thus, adding the individuals counted by 
the study to those we have been able to locate independently, there are 123 juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders serving life without parole sentences. A significant majority of 
those, 77 in total, are serving sentences imposed in Florida. The other 46 are 
imprisoned in just 10 States — California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia.” (citations omitted)). 
The Court cited to a Florida study that identified 109 inmates. PAOLO G. ANNINO ET 
AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NON-HOMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED 
TO NATION 2 (2009). The court further identified 14 additional inmates through its 
own research, bringing the total to 123. Graham, 560 U.S. at 64. 
 189 Erik Eckholm, Juveniles Facing Lifelong Terms Despite Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/us/juveniles-facing-lifelong-terms-despite-
rulings.html. 
 190 Guzman v. State, 110 So. 3d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 2013) (holding 
that trial court’s imposition of 60-year sentence on juvenile offender did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
 191 Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 2012). 
 192 Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1085-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 2012), rev’d, 
175 So.3d 675 (Fla. 2015).  
 193 Johnson v. State, 108 So. 3d 1153, 1153-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 2013). 
 194 Mediate v. State, 108 So. 3d 703, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th. 2013). 
 195 See Adams v. State, 188 So. 3d 849, 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that 
because 58.5 year sentence was a de facto life sentence imposed on a juvenile for non-
homicide offenses, it violated the Eighth Amendment); Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 45 
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Chart 1: Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) in 11 U.S. States 
Affected by Graham v. Florida (2010)196 
STATE NUMBER OF INMATES RESENTENCING RANGE 
CALIFORNIA 4 Life with possibility of parole 
DELAWARE 1 25 years to life
FLORIDA 77 25 to 45 years to life
IOWA 6 25 years to life 
LOUISIANA 17 Life with possibility of parole 
MISSISSIPPI 2 Life with possibility of parole 
NEBRASKA 1 N/A
NEVADA 5 Life to 100 years+
OKLAHOMA 1 Life with possibility of parole 
SOUTH CAROLINA 1 Life with possibility of parole 
VIRGINIA 8 Life to 100 years+
TOTAL 123
 
Since Miller was decided in 2012, twenty-one states have changed 
their laws to some extent, resulting in what some commentators have 
described as “an incoherent patchwork” of solutions.197 Some state 
legislatures have proactively rewritten their infirm statutes to require 
sentencers to consider a host of individualized factors before imposing 
harsh sentences upon juveniles,198 while others have taken pains to 
prevent individualized sentencing hearings altogether.199 Eight states 
 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing an 80 year sentence for a 17 year-old defendant). 
 196 Data is taken from Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2010) and from 
ANNINO ET AL., supra note 188, at 14.  
This data does not include juveniles who received juvenile life without parole 
sentences for non-homicide offenses at the same time they received a juvenile life 
without parole sentence for a homicide offense. Graham, 560 U.S. at 63. “It is difficult 
to say that a defendant who receives a life sentence on a nonhomicide offense but who 
was at the same time convicted of homicide is not in some sense being punished in 
part for the homicide when the judge makes the sentencing determination.” Id. 
 197 Chang et al., supra note 17, at 91. 
 198 Hawaii, for instance, now requires sentencing courts to consider 15 such factors 
before sentencing any juvenile convicted of homicide. H.B. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Haw. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 745 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(holding that, prospectively, Pennsylvania courts must account numerous age-related 
factors); S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013), http://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail? 
LegislationId=22426 (authorizing a judge to impose a discretionary sentence upon a 
juvenile convicted of first-degree murder which accounts for age-related sentencing 
factors).  
 199 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(1) (2017); see also Lewis v. State, 428 
S.W.3d 860, 863-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“Miller does not entitle all juvenile 
offenders to individualized sentencing. It requires an individualized hearing only when 
a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. . . . [U]nder Section 
12.31 of the [Texas] Penal Code, juvenile offenders in Texas do not now face life 
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have abolished juvenile life without parole,200 while others have 
explicitly retained the punishment.201 
As Chart 2 indicates, the laws enacted by states in response to Miller 
provide mandatory minimums ranging from a chance of parole after 
fifteen years (in Connecticut) to forty years (in Texas and 
Nebraska).202 Thirty-two states still allow life without parole as a 
sentencing option for juveniles,203 and in most states, the question of 
virtual life without parole has yet to be addressed. Seven states have 
not addressed Miller in any way. 
 
Chart 2: Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) in 28 U.S. States 
Affected by Miller v. Alabama (2012)204 
STATE INMATES 
SERVING 
MAND. 
JLWOP 
CURRENT 
RESENTEN-
CING 
RANGE 
REVISIONS TO LAWS MADE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY MILLER 
ALABAMA 62205 Life to 
JLWOP 
No new legislation; Sup. Ct. held that 
courts must consider 14 Miller factors 
before sentencing to JLWOP, State v. 
Henderson, 144 So. 3d 1262 (2013). 
ARKANSAS 58206 28 years to 
JLWOP 
Legislature retained JLWOP for 
capital murder, H.B. 1993 (2013). 
CONNECT-
ICUT 
4207  25-60 yrs 
(with parole 
at 15-30 
yrs) 
Legislature abolished JLWOP, S.B. 
796 (2015). 
 
without parole at all.”). “At least seven states — Virginia, Georgia, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin — [have responded with schemes 
that] eviscerate the considerations underlying Miller by limiting its application, in any 
form, to mandatory sentences of life without parole.” Chang et al., supra note 17, at 98. 
 200 Wyoming, for example, has abolished juvenile life without parole and replaced 
it with a range of 25 years to life with periodic review. H.B. 23, 62nd Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(Wyo. 2013). 
 201 32 states still allow the punishment as a sentencing option for juveniles. JOSHUA 
ROVNER, SENT’G PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3 (July 2016) 
[hereinafter JLWOP OVERVIEW], http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Juvenile_ 
Life_Without_Parole.pdf.  
 202 PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE AFTER MILLER V. ALABAMA 18, 
59, 87 (July 8, 2015), http://www.phillipsblack.org/s/Juvenile-Life-Without-Parole-After-
Miller.pdf. 
 203 JLWOP OVERVIEW, supra note 201. 
 204 Unless otherwise indicated, data is taken from PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra 
note 202, and Chang et al., supra note 17, at 95 tbl. 1. 
 205 PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 202, at 4. 
 206 Id. at 10. 
 207 Id. at 17-18. 
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DELAWARE 16208  25 years to 
life 
Legislature functionally abolished 
JLWOP, S.B. 9 (2013). 
FLORIDA 218209 35 to 
JLWOP 
Retained JLWOP; ordered automatic 
resentencing most serving mandatory 
JLWOP, H.B. 7035 (2014). 
HAWAII 0     Life (parole 
varies) 
Legislature abolished JLWOP, H.B. 
2116 (2014). 
IDAHO 4     Life to 
JLWOP 
None
ILLINOIS 94210  Life to 
JLWOP 
None 
IOWA 45211 Judicial 
Discretion 
None
LOUISIANA 300212  30 years to 
JLWOP 
Retained JLWOP, HB 152 (2013) 
MASS. 57213 20-30 years 
to life 
Sup. Ct. abolished JLWOP, 
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk 
Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013); 
new legislation enacted, Mass. Gen. 
L. Ch. 265, § 2 (2015). 
MICHIGAN 360214  25 years to 
JLWOP 
Retained JLWOP, S.B. 319 (2014). 
MINNESOTA 7215 
 
30 years to 
JLWOP 
No legislation; State v. Ali (2014) (in 
absence of constitutional statute, 
revived 30 to JLWOP). 
MISSISSIPPI 84216 
total   
 
Life to 
JLWOP 
No new legislation; Sup. Ct. declared 
existing laws unconstitutional; 
resentencing ordered, Parker v. State, 
119 So. 3d 987 (Miss. 2013). 
MISSOURI 84217  Life to 
JLWOP 
None
NEBRASKA 9218  40 years to 
JLWOP 
Retained JLWOP, LB 44 (2013). 
NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 
5219  Life to 
JLWOP 
None
 
 208 Id. at 20. 
 209 Id. at 26-27. 
 210 Id. at 33. 
 211 Id. at 37. 
 212 Id. at 42. 
 213 Chang et al., supra note 17, at 95. 
 214 PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 202, at 49. 
 215 Id. at 51. 
 216 Id. at 53. 
 217 Id. at 55. 
 218 Id. at 59. 
 219 Id. at 63. 
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NEW JERSEY 0220  Life to 
JLWOP 
None
N. 
CAROLINA 
79221  25 years to 
life 
Abolished JLWOP for fel. murd., S.B. 
635 (2012) 
OHIO 5222  25 to 30 
years to 
JLWOP 
No new legislation; Sup. Ct. held that 
courts must consider youth as a 
mitigating factor before sentencing to 
LWOP, State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 
(Ohio 2014).  
PENNSYL-
VANIA 
450223  25 - life 
(under 15) 
35 - JLWOP 
(15-17) 
Abolished JLWOP for under 15; S.B. 
850 (2012). 
S. 
CAROLINA 
26     Life No new legislation, but inmates being 
resentenced pursuant to: Aiken v. 
Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 2014) 
S. DAKOTA 3224  Judicial 
discretion. 
Retained JLWOP, S.B. 39 (2013). 
TEXAS 17225  40 years to 
life 
Abolished JLWOP, S.B. 2 (2015)  
VERMONT 0     Judicial 
Discretion 
None
VIRGINIA 22226  Life to 
JLWOP 
None
WASHING-
TON 
17227 
 
25 years to 
JLWOP 
Abolished JLWOP for under 16. 
Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 
(3)(a)(i) (2015). 
WYOMING 4228  25 years to 
life 
Abolished JLWOP, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 6-2-101(b), 6-10-301(c) (2013). 
3. Post-Conviction Impediments 
Atkins, Graham and Miller claims have also been derailed by the 
ubiquitous hurdles — such as retroactivity bars,229 stringent default 
doctrines230 and lack of counsel231 — that plague post-conviction in 
 
 220 Id. at 65. 
 221 Id. at 69. 
 222 Id. at 71. 
 223 Id. at 77. 
 224 Id. at 82. 
 225 Id. at 87. 
 226 Id. at 91. 
 227 Id. at 94. 
 228 Id. at 99. 
 229 See, e.g., id. at 2. 
 230 The Fifth Circuit, for example, rejected the argument that the limitations period 
should yield to claims of actual innocence based on evidence of mental retardation. 
See, e.g., In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 798 n.20 (5th Cir. 2007).  
  
2017] Implementing Proportionality 999 
most states, and by overt obfuscation and the creation of lax 
evidentiary rules that allow the admission of otherwise prejudicial 
evidence.232 A recent survey of Atkins claims conducted by Professors 
John Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Paul Marcus and Emily Paavola 
reveals the tremendous variation in success rates among states. As 
Chart 3 shows, while the success rate for Atkins claims in North 
Carolina between 2002 and 2014 was over 80%, for example, it was 
approximately 15% in Alabama, 11% in Georgia, and 0% in Florida233 
— a disparity that “corresponds with the availability of funding for 
post-conviction litigation” in the respective states.234 During the 
relevant period, Florida employed such a strict definition of 
intellectual disability that no claims prevailed.235 In fact, as already 
discussed, Florida’s scheme was so problematic that, in 2014, the 
Supreme Court struck a portion of it, declaring that it created “an 
unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be 
executed.”236 
 
Chart 3: Atkins Claims Decided on the Merits, 2002–2013237 
STATE ATKINS CLAIMS 
DECIDED ON MERITS 
CLAIMS 
AFFIRMED 
CLAIMS 
DENIED 
ALABAMA 34 5 29 
ARIZONA 11 5 6 
ARKANSAS 4 1 3 
CALIFORNIA 5 2 3 
COLORADO 4 3 1 
FLORIDA 24 0 24 
GEORGIA 9 1 8 
IDAHO 1 0 1 
ILLINOIS 0 0 0 
INDIANA 6 2 4 
KENTUCKY 9 1 8 
LOUISIANA 11 4 7 
 
 231 Cf. DOJ Statement of Interest on Juvenile Access to Counsel, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER 
CTR., http://njdc.info/doj-statement-of-interest-on-juvenile-access-to-counsel (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2016) (discussing the Justice Department’s statement noting juvenile’s 
insufficient access to counsel). 
 232 See, e.g., Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (utilizing a 
judicially created test for mental retardation that explicitly requires focus on the 
defendant’s behavior during the crime). 
 233 Blume et al., A Tale of Two, supra note 22, at 412-13. 
 234 Id. at 412 (citing Blume, Johnson & Seeds, supra note 157, at 629). 
 235 See, e.g., Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 270 (Ga. 2013). 
 236 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 
 237 These statistics are taken from Blume et al., A Tale of Two, supra note 22, at 412. 
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MISSISSIPPI 14 8 6 
MISSOURI 6 3 3 
NEBRASKA 1 0 1 
NEVADA 2 1 1 
NEW JERSEY 1 0 1 
NEW MEXICO 0 0 0 
NEW YORK 0 0 0 
N. CAROLINA 34 28 6 
OHIO 20 5 15 
OKLAHOMA 10 3 7 
OREGON 1 0 1 
PENNSYLVANIA 16 10 6 
S. CAROLINA 6 5 1 
TENNESSEE 8 0 8 
TEXAS 45 8 37 
UTAH 2 1 1 
VIRGINIA 7 0 7 
TOTAL 291 96 195 
 
What has consumed courts over the last several years, however, is 
identifying the individuals to whom Miller applies. While Graham 
spawned some litigation over its retroactive application,238 Miller 
created a firestorm. When Miller was decided, approximately 2,000 of 
the 2,500 juveniles serving life without parole sentences had been 
sentenced under mandatory schemes.239 The vast majority of those 
sentences were final and could be challenged only on collateral review. 
Because the Court said nothing about Miller’s application to these 
cases, states were left to wrestle with the Court’s modern retroactivity 
jurisprudence — the so-called Teague doctrine — which confines 
 
 238 See, e.g., Kleppinger v. State, 81 So. 3d 547, 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding Graham applies retroactively); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700-01 
(Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Dyer, 77 So. 3d 928, 929 (La. 2011) (holding compliance 
with Graham required removal of the defendant’s parole eligibility restriction). But see 
Lawson v. Pennsylvania, No. Civ.A. 09-2120, 2010 WL 5300531, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
21, 2010) (“[T]here is no indication that the Supreme Court has held Graham 
retroactively applicable on collateral review . . . .”); Jensen v. Zavaras, Civil Action No. 
08-cv-01670-RPM, 2010 WL 2825666, at *1-2 (D. Colo. July 16, 2010) (“Given the 
Court’s recognition of the many state statutes that permit life without parole for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders shown in the appendix to the opinion and the 
premise that Graham’s sentence was contrary to the majority’s view of ‘evolving 
standards of decency’ it is inconceivable that this new rule will be applied retroactively 
to invalidate sentences imposed in those states.”). 
 239 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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relief under new constitutional rules to cases that were not yet final at 
the time the rule was announced.240 
Between 2012 and early 2016, courts in six states — Alabama,241 
Louisiana,242 Michigan,243 Minnesota,244 Ohio,245 and Pennsylvania246 
— (comprising nearly 1,200 of the 2,100 inmates)247 refused to review 
mandatory juvenile life without parole sentences, declaring that Miller 
does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. However, 
courts in fourteen states — Arkansas,248 Connecticut,249 Florida,250 
Illinois,251 Iowa,252 Massachusetts,253 Mississippi,254 Nebraska,255 New 
Hampshire,256 North Carolina,257 South Carolina,258 Tennessee,259 
Texas,260 and Wyoming261 (comprising just over 600 inmates)262 ruled 
 
 240 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989). 
 241 Williams v. State, 183 So. 3d 198, 219-20 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014). 
 242 State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 843-44 (La. 2013). 
 243 People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 849 (Mich. 2014). 
 244 Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013). 
 245 State v. Shingleton, No. 25679, 2013 WL 5172952, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 
13, 2013). 
 246 Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9-10 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 2724 (2014). 
 247 Chang et al., supra note 17, at 94. 
 248 Hobbs v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 364, 369-70 (Ark. 2014). 
 249 Casiano v. Comm’r of Correction, 115 A.3d 1031, 1047-48 (Conn. 2015), cert. 
denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 136 S. Ct. 1364 (2016). 
 250 Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963-64 (Fla. 2015); see also Cotto v. State, 141 
So. 3d 615, 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540, 547 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 251 People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722-23 (Ill. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois 
v. Davis, 135 S. Ct. 710 (mem.) (2014). 
 252 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72-76 (Iowa 2013); see also State v. Ragland, 836 
N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013). 
 253 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney, 1 N.E.3d 270, 286-87 (Mass. 2013). 
 254 Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013). 
 255 State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Nebraska v. Mantich 135 S. Ct. 67 (2014). 
 256 In re New Hampshire, 103 A.3d 227, 236 (N.H. 2014); see also Tulloch v. Gerry, 
Nos. 12-CV-849, 13-CV-050, 13-CV-085, 08-CR-1235, 2013 WL 4011621, at *9 
(N.H. Super. Ct. July 29, 2013). 
 257 See State v. Lovette, 758 S.E.2d 399, 409-10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). 
 258 Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 578 (S.C. 2014). 
 259 Darden v. State, No. M2013-01328-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 992097, at *9-11 
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 260 Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
 261 State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 508 (Wyo. 2014). 
 262 Chang et al., supra note 17, at 94. 
  
1002 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:961 
the other way. Federal courts were generally inhospitable to Miller 
petitioners, affirming most state court decisions denying 
retroactivity.263 The retroactivity question has preoccupied both 
advocates and scholars.264 
 
 263 See, e.g., Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Morgan, 
713 F.3d 1365, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 
69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013); Grant v. U.S., No. 12-6844, 2014 WL 5843847, at 
*5-7 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2014); Starks v. Easterling, No. 3:11-0615, 2014 WL 4347593, 
at *10-11 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 2, 2014); Martin v. Symmes, No. 10-CV-4753, 2013 WL 
5653447, at *15 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013); see also Dumas v. Clarke, No. 2:13-cv-398, 
2014 WL 2808807, at *9-10 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2014); Landry v. Baskerville, No. 
3:13CV367, 2014 WL 1305696, at *10-11 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2014); Sanchez v. Vargo, 
No. 3:13CV400, 2014 WL 1165862, at *8-9 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2014); Stewart v. 
Clarke, No. 2:13cv388, 2014 WL 2480076, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2014), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 1899771 (E.D. Va. 2014). But see Songster v. Beard, 
35 F. Supp. 3d 657, 664-65 (E.D. Pa. 2014); McLean v. Clarke, No. 2:13cv409, 2014 
WL 5286515, at *12-13 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2014); Alejandro v. U.S., Nos. 13 Civ. 
4364(CM), S4 98 Cr. 290-06(CM), 2013 WL 4574066, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 
2013). 
 264 See, e.g., Moriearty, supra note 40; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Juvenile Life-Without 
Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 8, 2012, 
1:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without-
parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen (“[T]he Miller court did more than 
change procedures; it held that the government cannot constitutionally impose a 
punishment. As a substantive change in the law which puts matters outside the scope 
of the government’s power, the holding should apply retroactively.”); Marsha L. 
Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller and Jackson: Obtaining 
Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 385-86 (2013) 
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CRIM. L. 213, 215 (2014) (“[Miller], when taken together with . . . Roper v. Simmons, 
Graham v. Florida, and J.D.B v. North Carolina, creates a watershed rule that ‘kids are 
different’ and must be treated differently throughout the criminal trial process.”); The 
Supreme Court, 2011 Term — Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 276, 286 (2012) 
(concluding that “an implementation of procedural safeguards true to Miller’s 
underlying premises amounts to something close to a de facto substantive holding”); 
Jason M. Zarrow & William H. Milliken, The Retroactivity of Substantive Rules to Cases 
on Collateral Review and the AEDPA, with a Special Focus on Miller v. Alabama, 48 IND. 
L. REV. 931, 970 (2015) (arguing Miller “has both a procedural . . . and a substantive 
component,” and the substantive component should be applied retroactively); Molly 
F. Martinson, Comment, Negotiating Miller Madness: Why North Carolina Gets Juvenile 
Resentencing Right While Other States Drop the Ball, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2179, 2190-91 
(2013) (arguing that Miller represents a substantive change in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and therefore, must be applied to defendants whose sentences are 
already final); cf. Beth A. Colgan, Alleyne v. United States, Age as an Element, and the 
Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 262, 265 (2013) 
(“Miller’s requirement that sentencers consider age and its attendant consequences in 
cases involving juveniles — making age at the time of the offense a fact that triggers 
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This patchwork of retroactivity rulings has had stark implications. 
In the six states that declined to apply Miller retroactively, some 
individuals sentenced to mandatory life without parole as juveniles 
were eligible to benefit from Miller, while others were not, based upon 
nothing more than an accident of timing. Between states, two 
defendants convicted of the same crime on the same day might have 
entirely different prospects for release depending where they lived. 
Thus, in theory, a Miller petitioner in Minnesota who was convicted in 
2005 for a homicide committed when she was sixteen years old, but 
whose case was final when Miller was decided, would remain 
condemned to die in prison, while a Miller petitioner across the border 
in Iowa, convicted of the same offense, at the same age, on the same 
day, and whose case was also final, would have an opportunity for 
release. 
In January 2016, the Supreme Court stepped in. Granting the 
petition of an inmate who had been incarcerated for nearly fifty-three 
years for killing a sheriff’s deputy in Louisiana,265 the Court held that 
Miller does in fact apply to the 2,100 inmates whose cases were final 
when the decision was issued.266 In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the 
Court held Miller established a substantive rule of constitutional law 
because it rendered life without parole unconstitutional for a class of 
defendants because of their status as juveniles.267 
The Court also answered a second question — whether it even had 
jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
properly refused to give retroactive effect to Miller.268 The Court 
concluded that it did, reasoning that when a new substantive rule of 
constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, as it did in Miller, 
the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give 
retroactive effect to that rule, regardless of when the conviction in that 
case became final.269 “There is no grandfather clause that permits 
States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids,” Justice 
Kennedy wrote.270 
 
whether the mandatory minimum sentence of life without parole applies — converts 
age to an element of the underlying offense, rendering Miller a substantive rule that 
must be applied retroactively.”). 
 265 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2016). 
 266 Id. at 736-37. 
 267 Id.; see also Moriearty, supra note 40, at 981. 
 268 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 723-24. 
 269 Id. at 729. 
 270 Id. at 731. 
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Montgomery is significant not only for what it did in practice — 
providing an opportunity for resentencing to at least 1,200 individuals 
who had been denied it by the states in which they are incarcerated — 
but also for what it signaled: the Court’s recognition that many states 
were continuing, even after Roper, Graham and Miller, to punish 
juvenile offenders as harshly as they would adults. Montgomery also 
clarified that juvenile life without parole is presumed to be 
unconstitutional unless the juvenile is found to be “irreparab[ly] 
corrupt[]” or “permanently incorrigible.”271 Montgomery therefore 
expanded the Court’s ruling in Miller by increasing the likelihood that 
a juvenile homicide defendant would be able to show, at the time of 
sentencing, that he is in fact amenable to rehabilitation. In addition, by 
asserting its jurisdiction to decide the question of Miller’s retroactivity, 
the Court also tacitly acknowledged that it had, in the years prior, 
constricted federal review of state interpretations of constitutional law 
to a level that was untenable. 
Yet, even for those Miller inmates who were declared eligible for 
resentencing far in advance of Montgomery, few have received new 
sentences.272 And some have died in prison waiting to learn whether 
Miller applies retroactively. Robert Howard, an inmate who was 
incarcerated as a juvenile in Louisiana’s infamous Angola prison in 
1967, and had become well-known for his writing and youth work, 
was denied clemency requests for more than thirty years.273 Most 
recently, in March 2015, Governor Bobby Jindal denied a unanimous 
clemency request by the Board of Pardons and Parole.274 Weeks later, 
Mr. Howard was diagnosed with liver cancer, and he died in August 
2015275 — five months before the U.S. Supreme Court declared in 
Montgomery that Miller affords him relief. 
 
 271 Id. at 734. 
 272 See SENTENCING PROJECT, SLOW TO ACT: STATE RESPONSES TO 2012 SUPREME 
COURT MANDATE ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 3-4 (2014), http://sentencingproject. 
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SENTENCING LAWS AND COURT DECISIONS AFTER MILLER V. ALABAMA, https://www. 
cga.ct.gov/2015/rpt/2015-R-0089.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (collecting the 
litigation following Miller, few of which resulted in actual resentencing). 
 273 Liliana Segura, Supreme Court Gives New Hope to Juvenile Lifers, but Will States 
Deliver?, INTERCEPT (Jan. 26, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/01/26/ 
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 274 Id. 
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4. The Parole Problem 
In Montgomery, Justice Kennedy tried to reassure those states 
worried about processing hundreds of Miller claims that state courts 
need not re-litigate every mandatory juvenile life without parole 
sentence.276 Instead, he advised, Miller could be satisfied by allowing 
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole. “[P]risoners 
like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime 
did not reflect irreparable corruption,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “and, if 
it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must 
be restored.”277 Graham also promised individualization at the back-
end in the form of a parole hearing.278 “A State need not guarantee the 
offender eventual release,” the Court noted, as long as he is afforded 
“some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that 
term.”279 
The Court’s assurances raise far more questions than they answer, 
however. When during the course of incarceration must states provide 
this opportunity for release? How often must such opportunities be 
provided? What constitutes a “meaningful” opportunity? Do existing 
parole procedures fulfill these mandates? 
The problem, of course, is that state parole systems are not what 
they used to be. During the 1990s, amid the ideological movement 
from rehabilitation to retribution, the U.S. parole system constricted 
significantly. Release rates fell sharply, as truth-in-sentencing laws 
proliferated.280 Between 1976 and 1999, the percentage of total parole 
releases that were discretionary fell from sixty-five percent to twenty-
four percent.281 Today, more than three-quarters of parole releases are 
automatic,282 and nearly half the states and the federal government 
have largely dismantled their parole systems; just twenty-four states 
have parole boards that operate with complete discretionary review.283 
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Thus far, most of the remedies created by states simply make 
juvenile offenders eligible for parole under existing state parole 
practices.284 And while they have focused on the timing of eligibility 
for release, they have said little about how, or even whether, parole 
boards can provide a meaningful opportunity.285 These are questions 
that scholars have now begun to explore.286 
This is not to say that Miller has not yielded meaningful change. 
Since Miller, nine states have eliminated juvenile life without parole.287 
Preliminary data in two states suggests that as many as four out of five 
inmates granted resentencing hearings received a sentence that 
includes the possibility of parole.288 As commentators have noted, “the 
direction, consistency, and rate of change all suggest a mounting 
consensus against [juvenile life without parole].”289 Other states have 
recently raised the jurisdictional age for adult court, limiting the 
availability of juvenile life without parole and other adult sentences for 
juvenile offenders in those states.290 But these advances have been 
hard-won, to be sure. And there remain dozens of individuals in states 
across the country, who were sentenced to die in prison as juveniles, 
and who may well be resentenced to finish out those sentences. 
B. Substantive and Procedural Minimalism 
In many respects, the “slippage” of the Court’s substantive 
proportionality mandates is a natural and even foreseeable 
consequence of the decisions themselves, which are substantively and 
procedurally lean. Moreover, at the same time the Court was issuing 
these decisions, it was also, through a series of parallel decisions, 
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ANN. 404/5-120 West 1987) (changing jurisdictional age from 17 to 18); H.B. 305, 
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safeguarding the States’ autonomy over their criminal and collateral 
proceedings. Together, these features have made it far easier for states 
to evade the Court’s proportionality mandates. 
1. Regulatory Reticence 
In Atkins, Graham and Roper, the Court delegated to states critical 
definitional and procedural decisions about who was, and who was 
not, eligible for relief; how and when to make such a determination; 
how to replace newly unconstitutional statutes or sentencing schemes 
and with what alternatives. In the case of Graham, states were given 
discretion to decide what constitutes a “non-homicide offense,” and 
with Miller, how to determine which juveniles are sufficiently culpable 
to receive life without parole. With both Graham and Miller, states 
were left to decide what constitutes a “meaningful opportunity” for 
release; whether de facto life sentences for juveniles are constitutional; 
how and in accordance with what standard states should establish 
back-end release mechanisms; and who should make release decisions. 
As delineated in Part II.A,291 the Court’s refusal to answer these 
questions and regulate these issues has led to arbitrary and, in some 
cases, patently unjust outcomes. 
In the years leading up to Atkins, the Court issued numerous rulings 
that placed procedural constraints on the imposition of the death 
penalty — covering everything from mitigating evidence,292 to victim 
impact evidence,293 to what jurors must be told about alternative 
penalties,294 to prosecutorial misconduct.295 Yet, in Atkins, the Court 
expressly left to the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to 
enforce the constitutional restriction” on executing the mentally 
retarded.296 Though the Court referenced the DSM-IV-TR and AIDD, it 
did not mandate that states rely on clinical definitions of intellectual 
disability. It also said nothing about who should decide whether a 
capital defendant is intellectually disabled, what standard of proof 
should be utilized, and who should bear the burden of proof. 
The Court’s failure to address these questions has been highly 
problematic. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Florida, 
where, in the fourteen years since Atkins was decided, Atkins claims 
 
 291 See supra Part II.A. 
 292 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-05 (1976).  
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have rarely been successful. This may well have been what prompted 
the Court to intervene in 2014 in Hall v. Florida. 
In 2001, a year before Atkins was decided, Florida enacted a statute 
that defined intellectual disability as a “‘significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning.’”297 Though the statute itself did not 
impose a strict IQ cut-off, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted it as 
imposing a cut-off of seventy.298 Freddie Lee Hall had an IQ score of 
seventy-one, but challenged his death sentence with, among other 
things, a Florida trial court’s finding that “there was ‘substantial 
evidence in the record’ to support the finding that ‘Freddie Lee Hall 
ha[d] been mentally retarded his entire life.’”299 Nonetheless, the 
Florida Supreme Court rejected this evidence because Mr. Hall had 
not demonstrated that he had an IQ of seventy or below.300 He was 
therefore deemed eligible for execution.301 
In 2014, the Supreme Court held that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
imposition of a strict IQ cut-off and rejection of other evidence of 
intellectual disability violated Atkins for three reasons:302 first, 
Florida’s rule was inconsistent with clinical practice;303 second, other 
states had rejected such rigid rules;304 and, third, diagnosing 
intellectual disability required the incorporation of clinical 
expertise.305 “[C]linical definitions of intellectual disability . . . were a 
fundamental premise of Atkins,”306 the Court noted. The Court’s 
message was clear: “Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion 
to define the full scope of the constitutional protection.”307 While Hall 
may be just a modest step toward providing greater protection for 
criminal defendants with intellectual disabilities, it constitutes an 
important acknowledgment that the Court’s failure to provide 
“definitive procedural or substantive guides” 308 for determining when 
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a person is intellectually disabled for Eighth Amendment purposes, 
had led to outcomes that are constitutionally intolerable. 
In Graham, the Court’s refusal to provide a procedural roadmap for 
states prompted objections from the Court’s own Justices. In a 
plaintive dissent, Justice Thomas wrote: 
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime,’ but must 
provide the offender with ‘some meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.’ But what, exactly, does such a “meaningful” 
opportunity entail? When must it occur? And what Eighth 
Amendment principles will govern review by the parole boards 
the Court now demands that States empanel? The Court 
provides no answers to these questions, which will no doubt 
embroil the courts for years.309 
As Part II.A310 makes clear, Justice Thomas’s words have proved 
prescient. Because many states no longer have robust discretionary 
parole systems,311 they have had to create alternative sentencing and 
release structures. This raises critical questions about whether parole 
boards, judges or appointed commissions are best equipped make 
release decisions. In Florida, for example, rather than reinstitute 
parole, the Florida legislature decided that those eligible for 
resentencing under Graham and Miller must apply to states courts for 
second look sentencing hearings312 — a decision that has proven 
cumbersome since nearly 300 inmates were impacted by the decisions. 
Other states have taken different approaches.313 The problem, of 
course, is that it is not yet clear whether any of these approaches will 
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actually provide Graham inmates with a “meaningful opportunity” for 
release.314 
Miller’s primary unanswered question — whether the decision 
applies retroactively — has now been answered by the Court in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana. But what about the other open questions? 
Miller mandated that, before sentencing a juvenile to life without 
parole, sentencers must consider “youth and attendant 
characteristics.”315 But what are the “attendant characteristics” of 
youth? Should familial circumstances come into play? What about 
socioeconomic disadvantage? Harmful peer influences? Poor 
educational opportunities? And how should these characteristics be 
weighed? 
States have struggled to answer these questions. It has been more 
than three years since the Minnesota Supreme Court announced that 
Miller invalidated its first-degree murder sentencing statute as to 
juveniles.316 Since then, multiple bills have been brought before both 
the Minnesota Senate and House of Representatives which propose 
alternative sentencing schemes for juveniles convicted of aggravated 
forms of homicide.317 Yet, the legislature has failed to enact remedial 
legislation. 
In October 2014, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court held that, 
despite the Minnesota Legislature’s failure to act, the Minnesota trial 
courts nonetheless had the “inherent judicial authority to hold a Miller 
hearing” at sentencing and on remand prior to resentencing to 
determine whether to impose a sentence of life in prison with the 
possibility of parole at thirty years, or life without the possibility of 
parole.318 According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, a “Miller 
hearing” should, among other things, afford “the juvenile [the 
opportunity to] present evidence to establish the existence of any 
mitigating circumstances.”319 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Ali was the 
subject of intense debate among the Justices. The primary objection to 
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Ali is that the Court’s proposed remedy constitutes an impermissible 
intrusion upon the province of the Minnesota Legislature.320 By 
remanding Mr. Ali’s case to the state trial court and ordering the court 
to decide whether, after a Miller hearing, Mr. Ali should be sentenced 
to life without parole or life imprisonment with the possibility of 
release after thirty years, the Minnesota Supreme Court “encroach[ed] 
on the Legislature’s responsibility to fix the limits of punishment,” 
Justice Alan Page wrote in dissent.321 Instead, the proper remedy was 
to remand the case to the district court with instructions to impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release.322 Justice 
David Stras agreed, noting that “[i]t is well established that the 
judiciary does not write statutes; nor do we amend them, no matter 
the circumstances.”323 The proper remedy, according to Justice Stras, 
was to “remand the case to the district court with instructions to 
impose a sentence of life with the possibility of release.”324 
The Minnesota trial court took a different approach altogether. 
Minnesota Judge Peter Cahill determined that, if he issued a sentence 
of thirty years to life — the lowest end of the range prescribed in Ali 
— he need not hold a Miller hearing at all.325 The problem, however, 
was that Mr. Ali had been convicted in 2010 on three counts of 
murder, and had already received sentences of thirty years to life on 
two of the three.326 Thus, far from affording Mr. Ali the Miller 
tripartite (individualized consideration, a chance to present mitigating 
evidence, and a meaningful opportunity for release), the combined 
action (or inaction) of the Minnesota Legislature, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, and the Minnesota trial court meant that Mr. Ali now 
sits in a Minnesota state prison with a sentence of ninety years to 
life.327 This outcome almost certainly contravenes Miller. 
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In November 2016, the Supreme Court stepped in yet again, 
granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding five Arizona 
cases. In each, the trial courts had sentenced juvenile defendants to 
life without parole without addressing “whether the petitioner was 
among the very ‘rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect 
permanent incorrigibility.”328 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor 
clarified that “[e]ven if a court considers a child’s age before 
sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still 
violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”329 
Would it have made a difference if the Court in Miller, or more 
recently in Montgomery, had said more about what a Miller hearing 
should entail? Or whether the imposition of a functional life without 
parole sentence without such a hearing is constitutional? Quite 
possibly. 
2. Substantive Minimalism 
Despite their nominal substance, Graham, and especially Miller, are 
narrow decisions. Both decisions are grounded in the Eighth 
Amendment’s substantive proportionality framework, but neither 
decision is purely categorical. Though it bans juvenile life without 
parole for non-homicide offenders, Graham does not prevent juveniles 
from being denied parole and spending their lives in prison. In Miller, 
the Court opted for the narrowest of three possible rulings sought by 
the petitioners. Instead of striking down all life without parole 
sentences for juveniles as cruel and unusual, or banning such 
sentences for those fourteen and under, the Court merely banned the 
imposition of mandatory life without parole.330 Since striking down 
mandatory life without parole was “sufficient to decide [the] cases,”331 
the Court did not take on the broader issues. Nor did Miller foreclose 
the possibility that juvenile homicide offenders would be sentenced to 
life without parole at trial, or resentenced to life without parole on 
collateral review. 
 
 328 Tatum v. Arizona, 131 S.Ct. 11, 12 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 329 Id. 
 330 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-30 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012) (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322568, at *9-29; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
8-25, 31-35, Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647), 2011 WL 
5322575 at *8-25, *31-35. The Supreme Court consolidated Jackson with Miller for 
decision. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.  
 331 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
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The Court’s efforts to avoid a broad ruling in Miller have been called 
“unprincipled” and “unsound.”332 While Miller “purport[s] to embrace 
both Roper and Graham,” it “veers far from the principles of those 
cases,” Mary Berkheiser writes.333 As some scholars have observed, the 
notion that a discretionary life sentence is somehow less 
disproportionate than a mandatory one “without looking to a 
problematic measure of severity beyond sentence length, such as 
‘expected value’ or the hopelessness that can accompany life without 
parole,” is difficult to defend.334 Yet, as Richard Bierschbach and 
Stephanos Bibas have argued, the Court seemed to recognize that 
taking this step “could radically expand Eighth Amendment 
proportionality law, sweeping conditions of confinement and similar 
circumstances within its scope.”335 
The Court’s decision to take a narrow path in both Graham and 
Miller is likely the product of its broader commitment to judicial 
minimalism. Indeed, a number of commentators have argued that 
judicial minimalism is a hallmark of the Roberts Court.336 Miller may 
also reflect the Court’s concerns that it was not faithful enough to a 
minimalist approach in Roper. Justice O’Connor’s primary objection in 
Roper was that the Court did not need to impose “an arbitrary, 
categorical age-based rule,” but rather “through individualized 
sentencing” could “give appropriate mitigating weight to the 
defendant’s immaturity, his susceptibility to outside pressures, his 
 
 332 Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. 
Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down a 
Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489, 501, 507 (2013). 
 333 Id. at 501. 
 334 See, e.g., Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 28, at 398-99, 416 (arguing that “[i]f 
life imprisonment for juveniles were itself substantively cruel . . . the Court should 
have banned it outright instead of simply leaving open a chance at parole or allowing 
sentencers to impose LWOP on certain killers.” (citing Bierschbach, Proportionality 
and Parole, supra note 281, at 1759-64; Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the 
Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 77 (2010))). 
 335 Id. at 416. 
 336 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999) (making the case that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer were minimalists); Berkheiser, supra note 332, at 515 (“On the 
Roberts Court, all but the Court’s two most conservative jurists have embraced judicial 
minimalism in one form or another.”); David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge’s Mentor: Part Guide, 
Part Foil, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/us/ 
politics/22mentors.html (quoting former Yale Law Dean and Second Circuit Judge 
Guido Calabresi, who described Sotomayor’s approach in a controversial case as one of 
“judicial minimalism”); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 1, 2005) 
[hereinafter Minimal Appeal], https://newrepublic.com/article/64638/minimal-appeal 
(noting that Justice Roberts was likely to follow in O’Connor’s minimalist footsteps). 
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cognizance of the consequences of his actions, and so forth.”337 Chief 
Justice Roberts made a similar argument in his concurrence in 
Graham.338 
Yet, as Cass Sunstein has noted, judicial minimalism can impose 
significant burdens and lead to unpredictable outcomes.339 In avoiding 
an outright prohibition on life without parole for juveniles convicted 
of homicide, the Court left broader substantive questions about 
diminished culpability, mitigation, amenability to rehabilitation and 
meaningful opportunity for release, along with doctrinal questions 
about retroactivity, to be answered by the elected officials in the 
twenty-eight affected states. “It is in courtrooms across the country 
that the harsh mischief of minimalism will run its course,” Mary 
Berkheiser writes, “with outcomes uncertain and a life outside prison 
walls a mere hope.”340 In any constitutional context, this dynamic 
risks undermining the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy,341 
but unpredictability, disunity and error are especially intolerable when 
it comes to the regulation of our harshest punishments, because the 
costs are so great. 
3. AEDPA and Teague 
Compounding the impact of the Court’s minimalist and 
deregulatory approach in Atkins, Graham and Miller are its parallel 
efforts to safeguard the states’ autonomy over their criminal and 
collateral proceedings through a series of decisions that limit federal 
review and restrict retroactivity. Over the last several decades, the 
Court has imposed significant procedural constraints on inmates’ 
ability seek and obtain federal review of post-conviction claims. These 
constraints were expanded exponentially with the passage of the Anti-
 
 337 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 602-03 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 338 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 86 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(agreeing that Graham’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, but advocating 
reliance on existing precedents allowing for consideration of the particular defendant 
and particular crime at issue, rather than creating a new constitutional rule, as the 
majority had done).  
 339 See Cass Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825, 825 
(2007).  
 340 Berkheiser, supra note 332, at 516. 
 341 Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial 
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 312-14 (1998) (stating that when the Court 
adopts a minimalist framework it may result in many important issues being left 
unresolved and diverging implementation standards). 
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),342 
which the Court has interpreted in the narrowest fashion. In 
combination with the Court’s non-retroactivity jurisprudence, the 
Court’s decisions have significantly limited the ability of state inmates 
to obtain habeas corpus relief. 
Once hailed as the Great Writ, habeas corpus has been substantially 
diminished over the last three decades. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Court significantly constrained access to the federal courts 
through the use of procedural default, exhaustion, and other 
requirements.343 With few exceptions, the Court treated these 
procedural requirements as bars to the adjudication of federal 
constitutional claims, rationalizing this approach as necessary to 
promote the principles of federalism and finality.344 
The impact of these restrictions was amplified by the enactment of 
the AEDPA.345 Section 2254 of the AEDPA prohibits federal habeas 
relief for any claim “adjudicated on the merits” by the state court 
unless one of three exceptions is satisfied: (1) the state court decision 
was “contrary” to clearly established federal law; or (2) the state court 
decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law; or (3) the state court decision was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts.346 It also contains several 
procedural constraints, including a one-year statute of limitations,347 a 
bar on second-and-successive petitions,348 and an exhaustion 
requirement.349 Like its prior decisions, the Court characterized the 
purpose of the AEDPA as promoting the principles of finality, and 
federalism.”350 
 
 342 See 28 U.S.C. § 2554 (2012). 
 343 See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494-96 (1986) (discussing the need for 
both cause and prejudice to be shown to overcome a procedural default, “at least in a 
habeas corpus proceeding challenging a state court conviction,” and citing to 
“principles of comity and federalism”).  
 344 See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (noting that the doctrine of 
comity promotes, in part, judicial efficiency).  
 345 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 
101-08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2267 (2012)); 
Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 
447 (2007) [hereinafter AEDPA’s Wrecks]. 
 346 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).  
 347 Id. § 2244(d) (2012). 
 348 Id. § 2244(b). 
 349 Id. § 2254(b). 
 350 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).  
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In the first several years of the AEDPA’s existence, the Court granted 
relief in several cases.351 But through a series of decisions over the last 
decade, it has prevented the federal courts from exercising meaningful 
review over state court adjudication of constitutional claims.352 A state 
court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 
precedent, the Court explained, only if it “applies a rule that 
contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or if 
it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 
decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result 
different from [Court] precedent.”353 Thus, even if a state court 
interpreted constitutional precedent erroneously, federal habeas relief 
might still be denied. 
Subsequent cases have taken an even more restrictive view. In 
Harrington v. Richter, the Court rationalized its narrow interpretation 
of the AEDPA by asserting that “[f]ederal habeas review of state 
convictions frustrates both the States’ sovereign power to punish 
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional 
rights,” and “intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few 
exercises of federal judicial authority.”354 The net effect of the Court’s 
decisions is that, even though habeas petitions occupy almost seven 
percent of the federal docket,355 habeas relief is almost non-existent.356 
 
 351 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 379-80 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 518-19 (2003); Taylor, 529 U.S. at 420.  
 352 See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329, 337 (2007) (determining that the 
one-year statute of limitations § 2244(d)(2) is not tolled during the time between a 
final state court judgment on a state post-conviction motion and the filing of a petition 
for certiorari); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (finding that, because 
an untimely state court petition was not “properly filed,” habeas petitioner was “not 
entitled to . . . tolling under § 2244(d)(2)); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002) 
(interpreting § 2244(d)(2) to mean that a state post-conviction case is pending “until 
the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction 
procedures”).  
 353 Williams, 529 U. S. at 405-06. 
 354 Harrington v. Richter 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (explaining that AEDPA section 
2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a “guard against extreme malfunctions 
in the state criminal justice systems,” not a substitute for ordinary error correction 
through appeal). 
 355 Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 520-21 
(2014) (noting that 6.77 percent of cases filed in the district courts in 2012 sought 
non-capital post-conviction relief).  
 356 See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS; AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER 
THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, 51 n.87, 52 n.89 
(2007), http://perma.cc/D5V2-ZB6F (finding a grant rate of 13 percent in capital 
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The AEDPA has had an especially deleterious impact on Atkins 
claimants. As Lee Kovarsky has written, “[f]ederal courts will . . . 
encounter meritorious but defective Atkins claims because so much of 
the procedural status of a federal petition turns on the ability of 
impaired offenders to negotiate extraordinarily complex state post-
conviction process without counsel.”357 Atkins claims are frequently 
defaulted because claimants, often acting pro se, cannot meet the 
onerous standards of state post-conviction.358 
The AEDPA has also derailed Graham petitioners. In 2012, in Bunch 
v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit denied habeas relief to a juvenile serving an 
allegedly unconstitutional sentence by denying that any applicable 
“clearly established Federal law” existed at all.359 The petitioner, who 
was convicted of nonhomicide offenses committed at age sixteen, had 
been sentenced to eighty-nine years in prison and argued that, under 
Graham, this “functional equivalent” of life without parole for crimes 
he committed as a juvenile was cruel and unusual punishment. 360 
While the Sixth Circuit noted that even the warden had agreed that 
“Bunch’s eighty-nine year aggregate sentence may end up being the 
functional equivalent of life without parole,”361 it concluded that 
Graham did not apply because it “did not encompass consecutive, 
fixed-term sentences.”362 On that basis, the Court held that Graham 
was not “clearly established” for purposes of the AEDPA.363 
At the same time the Court was restricting habeas, the Court was 
also issuing numerous decisions restricting the retroactive application 
of new rules of criminal procedure.364 Spawned in the 1960s as a 
 
habeas cases but of only 0.34 percent in noncapital habeas cases); see also Nancy J. 
King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases After Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 308, 310 (2012) (observing that, after both district and circuit court 
review, habeas relief was granted in only 0.8 percent of noncapital habeas cases).  
 357 Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 
353 (2010). 
 358 Id. at 354. 
 359 Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 360 Id. 
 361 Id. at 551; see also id. at 553 n.1. 
 362 Id. at 551. 
 363 Id. at 550. 
 364 See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 349, 358 (2004) (holding that 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), (holding that the Sixth Amendment, which 
requires a jury (not a judge) to find aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the 
death penalty, does not apply retroactively to cases on federal habeas review); Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (holding that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
does not apply retroactively to cases on federal habeas review barring the application 
of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to convictions that had already 
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means of cabining the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, it 
was so readily expanded in cases like Miranda v. Arizona365 and Mapp 
v. Ohio366 that the Court finally settled in the late 1980s on a doctrine 
that would allow all new rules of constitutional law to apply 
retroactively to cases on direct review,367 but restricted their 
application to cases on collateral review to limited circumstances.368 In 
Teague v. Lane, the Court concluded that new constitutional rules 
would not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, subject to 
two exceptions: the first was for rules that “‘place[] ‘certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe;”369 and the second, much narrower 
exception was for watershed rules of criminal procedure that are 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and affect the accuracy of 
the conviction.370 
Over the years, critics have assailed Teague’s self-contradictory 
definition of a “new rule,”371 its extraordinarily restrictive second 
 
become final); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 727-32 (2016) 
(discussing the numerous procedural thresholds that a federal habeas petition must 
navigate in order to obtain relief).  
 365 384 U.S. 436, 489-99 (1966). 
 366 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 367 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (“We therefore hold that a new 
rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all 
cases . . . .”). 
 368 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-14 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“The fact that life 
and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions ‘shows only that “conventional 
notions of finality” should not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation, not 
that they should have none.’”). 
 369 Id. at 311 (arguing that “in some situations it might be that time and growth in 
social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the 
adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction” (quoting 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971))). This was subsequently found to 
include decisions that place a certain class of persons outside of a state’s power to 
punish. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 339 (1989), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (urging courts to rely on the 
concept of “mental age” when sentencing). 
 370 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. 
 371 Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity 
Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s 
Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 212 (2005) (“As fifteen years of Teague have taught, the 
new rule doctrine is interpreted in such an extraordinarily broad manner that it is 
removed from the traditional concerns and concepts that gave rise to retroactivity 
limits in general and in the context of habeas corpus proceedings in particular.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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exception for “watershed” rules of criminal procedure,372 and its 
treatment of retroactivity as a “threshold test.”373 Since Teague, the 
Court has considered the retroactivity of fifteen new rules of criminal 
procedure and, until Montgomery v. Louisiana, had yet to find that any 
of them fell within either of the Teague exceptions.374 
Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt recently argued that, by 
“[e]xalting notions of comity and finality above all else, and treating 
the constitutional rights at stake with the same lack of concern 
manifest elsewhere in their recent jurisprudence, the conservative 
justices who form the majority on the current Supreme Court — 
joined more and more frequently, for differing reasons, by their more 
moderate colleagues — [have] embarked on a path to render 
constitutional rulings by state courts nearly unreviewable by the 
federal judiciary.”375 Whether or not Judge Reinhardt is right about 
the Justices’ sentiments, he is right about the outcome. Operating 
virtually unchecked by the federal courts, and given license to restrict 
the remedial scope of the Court’s new proportionality rules, it is not 
surprising that states have taken wildly different approaches to 
implementation, leaving the substantive mandates announced in 
Atkins, Graham and Miller to “turn upon . . . trivialities,”376 “vary from 
place to place and from time to time,”377 and to create a procedural 
landscape that resembles a “crazy quilt.”378 The net effect has been 
constitutional slippage of the Court’s modern proportionality 
jurisprudence. 
 
 372 See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the 
Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What it Might, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1694 (2007) (“[N]o new procedural rule has yet satisfied the 
Teague exception, and the Court has strongly intimated that none shall.”). 
 373 See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or 
“Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give 
Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction 
Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (citing RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. 
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25.4 (5th ed. 2005) 
(“There is considerable consensus among commentators . . . that Teague’s ‘threshold 
question’ rule is misguided.”)). 
 374 See, e.g., Moriearty, supra note 40, at 981. 
 375 Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified 
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement 
of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 1219, 1221 (2015). 
 376 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996). 
 377 See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 
815).  
 378 See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006). 
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III. THE COSTS OF SLIPPAGE 
The primary rationale for the Court’s deregulatory and narrow 
approach to substantive constitutional decision-making and its 
jurisdictional deference to state criminal justice policies is the 
promotion of the principles of federalism and finality. I argue, 
however, that these rationales are far less compelling, and the 
constitutional slippage the Court’s measures often sow is far less 
tolerable, in the Eighth Amendment context. 
A. The Rationales 
Over the last two decades, as the Court has issued numerous 
decisions restricting both habeas corpus relief and retroactivity, it has 
repeatedly rationalized its stance as necessary to preserving federalism 
and finality.379 Scholars considering the proper scope of collateral 
review have long raised concerns about finality and federalism as 
well.380 While judicial minimalism is generally justified on pragmatic 
grounds,381 it, too, is rooted in a presumption of deference to the 
political branches and, implicitly, to the democratic accountability of 
 
 379 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (“In the habeas 
context, the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is 
grounded in concerns of comity and federalism.”); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 
U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (explaining that the purpose of the statutory habeas bars is to 
“further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism” (quoting Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000))); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 758 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“Federalism; comity; state sovereignty; preservation of state resources; 
certainty: The majority methodically inventories these multifarious state interests [to 
support its holding].”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (concluding that, in 
the “interests of comity and finality,” new constitutional rules would not apply 
retroactively to cases on collateral review, subject to two exceptions).  
 380 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452, 528 n.21 (1963) (emphasizing the 
importance of the finality of criminal judgments); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 152-54 
(1970) (citing finality concerns as a basis for limited habeas review); see also Nicole 
Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 462 (2011) (noting that 
“the Rehnquist Court began a federalism revolution that now has been at least 
partially adopted by the Roberts Court”); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 575, 577-79 (1993) (discussing how finality, comity, and federalism 
interests are invoked in theories on the proper scope of the habeas writ). 
 381 SUNSTEIN, supra note 336, at 51-54 (arguing that minimalism promotes stability 
and predictability and also empowers democratic deliberation by giving political 
decision-makers room to maneuver and respond to constitutional questions left open 
by the Supreme Court). 
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state policy-makers.382 I argue, however, that these rationales are 
simply less compelling when it comes to the implementation of 
proportionality mandates. 
1. Finality 
As Doug Berman wrote, “different conceptual, policy and practical 
considerations are implicated when a defendant seeks only review and 
reconsideration of his final sentence and does not challenge his 
underlying conviction.”383 Since neither the practical burdens of retrial 
nor theoretical concerns about undermining the consequentialist 
objectives of punishment are as pronounced with sentences of 
incarceration as they are with convictions, concerns about preserving 
final judgments are significantly diminished.384 Unlike trials, which 
require extensive resources and depend on evidentiary preservation 
and presentation, sentencing is at least as prospective as it is 
retrospective. The risks of inaccuracy, spoiled evidence and procedural 
illegitimacy are simply not as great during re-sentencing as they are 
during retrial.385 Trials also have different objectives than sentencing 
hearings. While trials “are designed and seek only to determine the 
binary question of a defendant’s legal guilt,” sentencing hearings “are 
structured to assess and prescribe a convicted offender’s future and 
fate.”386 Moreover, reducing a sentence of incarceration may actually 
save resources that otherwise would have been spent on the operation 
of corrections systems. 
 
 382 See Diane Sykes, Minimalism and Its Limits, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 19 
(2015) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 369-70 
(2006)). 
 383 See Berman, supra note 42, at 152, 165 (“Sentence finality, in short, has gone 
from being a non-issue to being arguably one of the most important issues in modern 
American criminal justice systems.”); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: 
Courts, Congress and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 88-89 (2012) [hereinafter 
Russell, Reluctance to Resentence] (noting the weakness of finality interests at stake 
compared to requests for sentence correction). But see Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the 
Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 181, 
181-82 (2014) (arguing “in defense of the finality of criminal sentences on collateral 
review”). 
 384 See Moriearty, supra note 40, at 981; see also Berman, supra note 42, at 165-76 
(urging policymakers to revisit the proportionality-finality balance in light of the 
increasing use and length of prison sentences); Russell, Reluctance to Resentence, supra 
note 383, at 88-89 (2012) (noting the weakness of finality interests at stake compared 
to requests for sentence correction).  
 385 See Berman, supra note 42, at 166-68. 
 386 Id. at 167. 
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In fact, interests in finality may be even less persuasive in the case of 
proportionality rules than they are with other sentencing rules. No 
sentence of incarceration, after all, is ever really final until it has been 
fully served.387 Since the Court’s modern proportionality decisions 
have proscribed only the harshest sentences for the narrowest classes 
of individuals, such decisions are more likely than decisions grounded 
in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, for example, to apply to 
active prisoners. Those standing to benefit from the application of new 
proportionality rulings are, as a conceptual matter, the least likely to 
have final sentences. 
2. Federalism 
Finally, even if, as the Court has stated, “[n]onuniformity is . . . an 
unavoidable reality in a federalist system,”388 there is a point at which 
society’s interests in federalism must yield. Both the Court389 and the 
Framers have recognized as much. “The Constitution’s text can be 
read to suggest the Framers were decidedly eager to provide or 
preserve opportunities for defendants to seek review and 
reconsideration of their treatment by government authorities,” writes 
Doug Berman.390 They did so in three primary ways: Article I, Section 
9 of the Constitution instructs Congress that the “Privilege of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended;”391 Article II, Section 2 
provides that the President “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offences against the United States;”392 and Article III, 
Section 2 provides that the Supreme Court “shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction.”393 Thus, while the Framers sought to preserve state 
sovereignty over matters of criminal process,394 they were also 
 
 387 Id. at 171. 
 388 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008).  
 389 See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921) (“The Constitution was 
intended — its very purpose was — to prevent experimentation with the fundamental 
rights of the individual.”).  
 390 See Berman, supra note 42, at 155. 
 391 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.  
 392 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
 393 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
 394 Berman, supra note 42, at 154 (observing that “criminal adjudications in the 
Founding Era lacked many of the legal formalities and procedural particulars now 
familiar to modern lawyers: criminal trials, which were frequent and speedy, involved 
a ‘common-sense, public moral judgment’ in which laymen were central players” 
(citation omitted)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“[I]n 
areas such as criminal law enforcement or education . . . States historically have been 
sovereign.”). 
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unequivocal in their intent to give criminal defendants in the colonial 
era various means of challenging government action. Indeed, at 
common law, the writ had very little to do with the federalism 
concerns articulated today.395 
Despite its dilution over the last three decades, the Court has long 
embraced the view that one of the critical purposes of post-conviction 
relief and the writ of habeas corpus is to check the abuse of 
government power.396 As Justice Frankfurter wrote a half century ago: 
The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of 
our law cannot be too often emphasized. It differs from all 
other remedies in that it is available to bring into question the 
legality of a person’s restraint and to require justification for 
such detention. . . . It is not the boasting of empty rhetoric that 
has treated the writ of habeas corpus as the basic safeguard of 
freedom in the Anglo-American world. . . . Its history and 
function in our legal system and the unavailability of the writ 
in totalitarian societies are naturally enough regarded as one of 
the decisively differentiating factors between our democracy 
and totalitarian governments.397 
Justice Kennedy addressed this proposition in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana. Acknowledging that, when a new substantive rule of 
constitutional law is established, the Court is “careful to limit the 
scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding 
more than necessary upon the States’ sovereign administration of their 
criminal justice systems,” he emphasized that “[f]idelity to this 
important principle of federalism . . . should not be construed to 
demean the substantive character of the federal right at issue.”398 
B. The Costs 
1. Offending Norms 
By contrast, the risks of offending constitutional norms through 
slippage may be at their most pronounced with Eighth Amendment 
 
 395 See Bator, supra note 380, at 445-46 (analyzing the history and use of federal 
habeas corpus in the United States). 
 396 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 509-512 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(discussing the historical significance of the writ of habeas and praising its role in the 
American criminal justice system).  
 397 Id. at 512 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 398 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016). 
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proportionality rules. Like the writ of habeas corpus, it has long been 
accepted that one of the Eighth Amendment’s primary functions is to 
serve as a check on states’ propensity to overreact in times of moral 
panic.399 This premise is especially relevant to the implementation of 
the Court’s contemporary proportionality jurisprudence. 
The majority of punishments implicated by Atkins, Graham and 
Miller were meted during the during the “get tough” era of the 
1990s400 — a period when the incarceration rate in the United States 
rose exponentially and, in the words of one scholar, this country 
“witnessed the broadest and most sustained legislative crackdown ever 
on serious offenses committed by youth within the jurisdictional ages 
of American Juvenile Courts.”401 Yet, by tying the scope of its 
proportionality protections to state level politics, as it has done with 
these three decisions, the Court subjects them to the same 
majoritarian preferences that generated the moral panic and led to the 
constitutional infirmities in the first place. In the words of Donald 
Dripps, when it comes to sentencing, policymakers are prone to 
apathy because they simply do not “give a damn about the rights of 
the accused.”402 
This may explain why the Supreme Court and lower courts have, 
historically, afforded a broader remedial scope to new proportionality 
rules than they have to new Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rules. In an article published a quarter century ago, 
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer argued that an inquiry into the 
“nature and purpose of [a Constitutional] right” is one appropriate 
metric for assessing its remedial scope.403 “At one end [of the 
 
 399 Stinneford, supra note 44, at 907 (noting that the historical focus was not on 
punishments that were ‘“cruel and rare” but on those that are “cruel and new,” which 
suggests “the core purpose of the Clause is to protect criminal offenders when the 
government’s desire to inflict pain has become temporarily and unjustly enflamed, 
whether this desire is caused by political or racial animus or moral panic in the face of 
a perceived crisis”); see also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 159-62 
(2002) (tracing the ebb and flow of the counter-majoritarian critique of the United 
States Supreme Court); cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 2nd ed. (1986) (discussing the counter-
majoritarian nature of judicial review).  
 400 TONRY, supra note 82, at 202-05. 
 401 Franklin Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological 
Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999). 
 402 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of 
Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn about the Rights of the Accused, 
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993).  
 403 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
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spectrum] lie rules and decisions that hold a defendant’s conduct 
constitutionally immune from punishment,” while “at the other end of 
the spectrum stand rules whose purposes are substantially deterrent,” 
such as the “exclusionary rule.”404 The nature and purpose of the 
former “clearly calls for retroactive application even of surprising 
holdings,” while the “argument for retroactive application” of the 
latter is “relatively weak.”405 “Occupying the middle of the spectrum 
are rules that involve procedural protections, rather than 
constitutional immunities from prosecution.”406 Though not explicit, 
Fallon and Meltzer seemed to be distinguishing between Eighth 
Amendment rules, which should be given broad remedial effect, 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules, for which the argument was 
weak, and Sixth Amendment rules, which could go either way. 
2. Legitimacy 
Issuing substantive mandates with no assurance of their 
enforcement also undermines the Court’s own legitimacy. Carol and 
Jordan Steiker have suggested that “perhaps the Court’s willingness to 
cede to the states the authority to craft procedures reflects its view that 
the substantive right extends only so far.”407 Or perhaps the Court 
underestimated the extent to which state procedures would impede 
the substantive right.408 Regardless of the Court’s rationale, the same 
questions of legitimacy raised by the excess proceduralization of the 
1980s and 1990s are raised by the Court’s contemporary 
proportionality jurisprudence. “A survey of the post-Atkins landscape 
makes clear that the problem of ‘legitimation’ is not the exclusive 
province of excessive proceduralism,” the Steikers write.409 
Illegitimacy becomes especially problematic where, as here, the vast 
majority of those who stand to benefit from these substantive rights 
are people of color. 
 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1738-53 (1991) (sketching the 
development of the retroactivity doctrine). 
 404 Id. at 1808. 
 405 Id. 
 406 Id.  
 407 Steiker & Steiker, Lessons from Substance, supra note 6, at 731. 
 408 Id. at 732.  
 409 Id. at 733 (emphasis added). 
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C. Anti-Evasion Doctrine 
If the Court is serious about implementing in practice the 
substantive constraints on punishment that it has imposed through its 
modern proportionality jurisprudence, it must be willing to better 
define their scope and regulate their enforcement. Recently, a handful 
of commentators have explored the use of what they call the Court’s 
prophylactic “anti-evasion doctrines,” procedural mandates which 
seek “to optimize constitutional enforcement by curbing 
circumvention of constitutional principles.”410 The objective of these 
standards is to prevent elected officials from “complying with the form 
of the previously announced rule, while subverting the substance of 
the constitutional principle the rule sought to implement.”411 
The Supreme Court can and should embed both substantive and 
procedural “anti-evasion” mandates into its Eighth Amendment 
sentencing jurisprudence. In the Atkins context, the Court’s decision 
in Hall v. Florida, which clarifies that Atkins requires states to 
incorporate professional views about threshold IQ scores and adaptive 
functioning, is a critical first step. To reinforce this mandate, the 
Court should, in every capital case, place the burden of proof on the 
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant does not 
suffer from “mental retardation.” Because the capital sentencing 
process constitutionally requires an exhaustive examination of 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, such a requirement would not be 
unduly burdensome. 
With respect to Graham and Miller, the simplest solution would, of 
course, be for the Court to ban juvenile life without parole altogether. 
Short of this, the Court should be explicit about the sentences to 
which the protections articulated in Miller and Montgomery apply. The 
Court could define as functional life without parole any term-of-years 
prison sentence that denies a juvenile defendant the opportunity to 
demonstrate rehabilitation and obtain release. Several state courts have 
already adopted such an approach.412 
 
 410 Denning & Kent, supra note 47, at 1776; see also Stephenson, supra note 47, at 
4 (arguing that courts should protect constitutional guarantees by using doctrines 
designed to raise the cost to government decisionmakers who enact unconstitutional 
policies).  
 411 Denning & Kent, supra note 47, at 1776. 
 412 In State v. Null, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a sentence for a 
juvenile non-homicide offender that did not grant parole eligibility until age sixty-
nine, merited the same analysis as a sentence explicitly termed “life without parole” 
and was unconstitutional under Graham. 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013). “[W]e do 
not believe the determination of whether the principles of Miller or Graham apply in a 
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Hall and Montgomery plainly reflect the Court’s efforts to prevent 
states from circumventing the constitutional principles at stake in 
Atkins and Miller. They also indicate that the Court is willing to 
entertain new constitutional challenges when it comes to the 
imposition of the harshest punishments on the least culpable of our 
citizens. Of course, we know from experience that there are associated 
costs. Placing too much emphasis on procedure risks eclipsing the 
constitutional principles themselves,413 which is arguably what 
happened in the era of excess formalism. But, I argue, the costs of 
under-enforcement in the Eighth Amendment context are far greater. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, Roper v. 
Simmons, Kennedy v. Louisiana, Graham v. Florida and Miller v. 
Alabama revitalized the Court’s substantive proportionality 
jurisprudence in critical respects, to be sure. Yet, three of the five 
decisions simply have not translated to meaningful relief in practice. 
While the Court may continue to rationalize constitutional slippage as 
 
given case should turn on the niceties of epidemiology, genetic analysis, or actuarial 
sciences in determining precise mortality dates[,]” the Court explained. Id. at 71-72; 
see also State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013) (striking down a 35-year 
sentence that would render a juvenile defendant eligible for parole at age 52 because it 
“effectively deprived [him] of any chance of an earlier release and the possibility of 
leading a more normal adult life”); Casiano v. Comm’r of Correction, 115 A.3d 1031, 
1045 (Conn. 2015) (ruling that a 60-year sentence is the functional equivalent of a life 
without parole sentence, based on life expectancy and geriatric release arguments); 
Thomas v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-4537, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181876, at *39 (E.D. Pa. 
June 5, 2012) (holding parole eligibility at age 82 is the functional equivalent of a life 
without parole sentence because it would surpass the defendant’s life expectancy); 
Adams v. State, 188 So.3d 849, 851-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (ruling that a 58.5 
year sentence is the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence because it 
surpasses life expectancy statistics).  
 413 See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 542 (1998) (authorizing 
prisoner’s execution and finding that a “grave abuse of discretion” took place on 
finality and federalism grounds after the Ninth Circuit recalled its mandate and 
granted habeas relief based on a law clerk miscommunication); Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390, 411 (1993) (holding that actual innocence claim based on newly discovered 
evidence was not a ground for federal habeas corpus relief without an independent 
constitutional violation and that Texas’ process did not violate “fundamental fairness,” 
resulting in Petitioner’s execution); Report & Recommendation, Chambers v. Roy, 
No. 14-CV-2552 (PJS/BRT) (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2015) (analyzing the many procedural 
bars, prerequisites to federal habeas relief, and deference granted to state 
adjudications); see also Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 345, at 444-46 (2007) 
(analyzing the guiding principles of modern federal habeas doctrine and the difficulty 
of obtaining relief). 
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a necessary byproduct of its deference to society’s interests in 
federalism and finality, these justifications are simply less compelling 
in the Eighth Amendment context. And the constitutional norms at 
stake are far too great. 
The Court’s recent decisions in Hall v. Florida and Montgomery v. 
Louisiana reflect the Court’s apparent awareness that, if it really wants 
to end the execution of the intellectually disabled and the 
indiscriminate life imprisonment of juveniles, it has to say more about 
how, when, where and to whom the mandated relief applies. Striking a 
proper balance between substantive mandates and procedural 
prescription will continue to be important in the coming years as, in 
all likelihood, the United States moves back toward the more moderate 
approach to criminal and juvenile justice the rest of the western world 
has long embraced. As our standards of decency continue to evolve, 
more substantive proportionality mandates will likely emerge. And 
with these mandates will come serious questions about their 
implementation. The Court would do well to consider such questions 
as it promulgates proportionality. 
